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REIMAGINING HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: TOWARD GLOBAL
REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS
RACHEL J. ANDERSON†
INTRODUCTION
Existing human rights law, the body of law that delineates the contours of legal protections for human rights, does not do enough to prevent or provide remedies for corporate-related human rights abuses.1
Transnational corporations are generally excluded from direct responsibility under international human rights law.2 The state-centered nature of
modern human rights law is inconsistent with the actual power and influence of many transnational corporations.3 Current human rights law has
been conflated with international human rights law and so looks almost
exclusively to states to create laws to protect human rights and mechanisms to enforce those laws.4 However, many modern transnational cor† Associate Professor of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, William S. Boyd School of
Law; J.D. 2005, University of California, Berkeley School of Law; M.A. 2002, Stanford University
International Policy Studies; Zwischenprüfung 1998, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. Research for
this article was supported by Dean John V. White. I would like to thank Larry Catá Backer, Monica
Bell, Richard Buxbaum, David Caron, Linda Edwards, Mary LaFrance, Andrew Guzman, Fatma
Marouf, Saru Matambanadzo, Audrey McFarlane, Ann McGinley, Tom McAffee, David Millon, Jay
Mootz, Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Janewa Osei-Tutu, Nancy Rapoport, Paulette Reed-Anderson.
Jean Sternlight, Asmara Tekele, Marketa Trimble, the participants at the Lytle Workshop at the
University of Kentucky School of Law in June 2010, the participants at Junior Scholars Workshop at
the Southeastern Association of Law Schools annual meeting in August 2010, and the participants at
the Vulnerability and the ‘Corporation’ Workshop as part of the Feminism and Legal Theory Project
at Emory University School of Law in October 2010 for their comments and suggestions. I am
indebted to Jeanne Price and David McClure at the Wiener-Rogers Law Library for their outstanding
assistance and support. I also would like to express my deep appreciation to the editors at the Denver
University Law Review for their hard work, excellent editing, and consistent professionalism.
1. See SARAH JOSEPH, CORPORATIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION 9
(2004); see also Edward L. Rubin, Response to Comments, 9 INT’L LEGAL THEORY 167, 173 (2003)
(“[H]uman rights discourse fails to reflect the conceptual structure and practical realities of the
modern administrative state.”). See generally JOSEPH, supra note 1 (analyzing human rights litigation against transnational corporations).
2. See Surya Deva, Human Rights Violations by Multinational Corporations and International Law: Where From Here?, 19 CONN. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (2003) (“[S]ince the existing international
mechanism was not designed to apply to [transnational corporations], its inadequacy is exposed.”).
3. See id. (“States no longer enjoy the monopoly as violators of human rights and no longer
solely bear the duty to protect human rights.”). States are at the center of international human rights
law because they are at the center of international law. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 57–58 (5th ed. 1998).
4. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR], available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm
(“Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State Party to the
present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such laws or other measures as may
be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.”); see also, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights art. 2, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter ICESCR], available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm (“Each State Party
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porations have achieved a level of power, wealth, and influence that rivals that of states.5 Failure to regulate the power, wealth, and influence of
transnational corporations is a weakness in human rights law that should
be remedied.6
This Article argues that transnational corporations require specialized and targeted regulations and laws, and that the conflation of human
rights law and international human rights law should be reversed to allow
the advancement of other forms of human rights law. It makes two proposals. First, reimagine human rights law and international human rights
law as separate categories. Specifically, classify international human
rights law as a sub-category of human rights law. This distinction highlights the need to encourage the development of other forms of human
rights law, for example, global human rights law and national human
rights law. Second, establish global human rights law as a sub-category
of human rights law. Specifically, create a new global human rights regime with three main elements: a Global Law Commission, global laws
and regulations, and universal civil jurisdiction.
In the summer of 2009, the U.S. news media was dominated by reports about the BP oil spill.7 The United States Environmental Protection
Agency Administrator described it as “the largest environmental disaster
in American history.”8 But although similar events have occurred many
times over in developing countries, they have not captured the attention
of the U.S. media in the same way.9 For example, a major oil spill the
size of the Exxon Valdez disaster has occurred every year for half a cen-

to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through international assistance
and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with
a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant
by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.”). However,
“international legal institutions typically only have advisory powers and are unable to ‘make’ states
take particular action.” Angela M. Banks, CEDAW, Compliance, and Custom: Human Rights Enforcement in Sub-Saharan Africa, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 781, 782 (2009).
5. JOSEPH, supra note 1, at 1; Hope Lewis, Embracing Complexity: Human Rights in Critical Race Feminist Perspective, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 510, 519 (2003) (“Many [transnational
corporations] have more economic resources at their disposal than the entire budget available to
some developing countries; they can exert influence that approximates that of a state in some circumstances.”).
6. See Deva, supra note 2, at 3 (“[T]he approach of indirect regulation has failed to deliver
the desired results.”).
7. For example, a search on July 3, 2010 for “BP oil spill 2010” in Google news resulted in
22,100 hits.
8. Lisa P. Jackson, Administrator Jackson: Keep Moving America Forward into Energy
Independence, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY , http://blog.epa.gov/administrator/2010/06
/08/administrator-jackson-%e2%80%9ckeep-moving-america-forward-into-energy-independence
%e2%80%9d/ (last updated Oct. 27, 2010). However, others contend that the “Dust Bowl” of the
1930s may be the largest environmental disaster on U.S. territory. See, e.g., Ed Stoddard, Is Gulf
Spill the Worst Ecological Disaster in U.S. History?, REUTERS ENVIRONMENT FORUM (June 22,
2010, 10:09 AM), http://blogs.reuters.com/environment/2010/06/is-gulf-spill-the-worst-ecologicaldisaster-in-u-s-history/.
9. A search for “Niger Delta oil spill” in Google news on July 3, 2010 resulted in 154 hits.
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tury in the Niger Delta.10 Environmental disasters overseas often involve
a subsidiary of a U.S. corporation, as was the case in the Bhopal disaster
in which toxic gas leaked from a pesticide plant, killing an estimated
2,100 people and injuring over 200,000 others.11 Nonetheless, oil spills
in the Niger Delta and other developing countries—and the harms they
cause— do not receive the same level of attention in the U.S. media.12
Environmental catastrophes like the 2010 BP oil spill and the decades of oil spills in other places like the Niger Delta impinge upon human rights—such as the rights to life, health, adequate food and housing,
and clean water.13 Life, health, and other human rights are enumerated,
for example, in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and
other human rights documents.14 In the BP oil spill, eleven people were
killed in the explosion.15 In some cases in the Niger Delta, oil drilling
and associated gas flares have made entire villages uninhabitable.16 Oil
drilling and gas flares have had devastating effects on both the environment and human health, and have led to convulsions, chromosomal dam-

10. Adam Nossiter, Far From Gulf, a Spill Scourge 5 Decades Old, N.Y. TIMES, June 17,
2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/17/world/africa/17nigeria.html (“The
Niger Delta, where the wealth underground is out of all proportion with the poverty on the surface,
has endured the equivalent of the Exxon Valdez spill every year for 50 years by some estimates.”).
For details of the amount of oil spilled in the Niger Delta between 1976 and 1996, see Odjuvwuederhie Emmanuel Inoni, Douglason Gordon Omotor & Felicia Nkem Adun, The Effect of Oil Spillage
on Crop Yield and Farm Income in Delta State, Nigeria, 7 J. CENT. EUROPEAN AGRIC. 41, 43
(2006), available at http://www.agr.hr/jcea/issues/jcea7-1/pdf/jcea71-6.pdf.
11. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec., 1984, 634 F. Supp.
842, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff’d and modified, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987).
12. A search for “Niger Delta oil spill” on July 3, 2010 resulted in less than one percent of the
hits for “BP oil spill 2010” on the same date although the search is narrower and there has been the
equivalent of a major spill in the Niger Delta every year for at least 50 years.
13. See U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary General, Protect, Respect & Remedy: A
Framework for Business & Human Rights: Second Addendum, 3, 29, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5/Add.2
(May 23, 2008) [hereinafter Protect, Respect & Remedy], available at http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G08/136/61/PDF/G0813661.pdf?OpenElement.
14. ICCPR, supra note 4, at art. 6; ICESCR, supra note 4, at art. 7, 12; Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/Res/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter
UDHR]. However, there continues to be disagreement about the legitimacy and enforceability of
economic, social, and cultural rights. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Rethinking Human Rights, 9 INT’L
LEGAL THEORY 5, 5–6 (2003) (discussing the controversy associated with the extent to which social,
cultural, and economic rights are accepted).
15. Bradley Blackburn, BP Oil Spill: Families Gather to Honor 11 Who Died, Express Frustration With BP, Transocean, ABC NEWS (May 25, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/WN/bp-oil-spilltransocean-holds-memorial-11-lost/story?id=10739080.
16. Factsheet: Shell’s Environmental Devastation in Nigeria, CENTER FOR CONST. RTS.,
http://ccrjustice.org/learn-more/faqs/shell%2526%2523039%3Bs-environmental-devastation-nigeria
[hereinafter CCR] (last visited Oct. 27, 2010). The devastation was so extensive that Ken SaroWiwa, the leader of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, described the oil drilling
operations as “an ecological war against the Ogoni.” Fifth Amended Complaint and Demand for
Jury Trial ¶¶ 1, 53, Wiwa v. Shell Petroleum, No. 96 Civ. 8386 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2009),
http://ccrjustice.org/files/3.16.09%205th%20Amended%20Complaint.pdf [hereinafter Wiwa Fifth
Amended Complaint].
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age, birth defects, and other serious illnesses.17 The U.S. news was filled
with pictures of the extreme damage of BP’s spills and yet most people
in the United States are completely unaware of the Niger Delta disasters.
However, environmental catastrophes are not the only way that the
operations of transnational corporations like BP negatively affect human
rights.18 Transnational corporations, as “economic entit[ies] operating in
more than one country or [as] a cluster of economic entities operating in
two or more countries,” help shape the economic, political, social, and
legal environments in which they operate.19 Transnational corporations
are a subset of corporations and, therefore, much of the discussion of
transnational corporations in this Article also applies to domestic corporations, although there are, of course, important differences.20
Transnational corporations also impinge on human rights in the labor context.21 One well-known example is the Nike scandal in the 1990s,
when Life magazine exposed Nike’s involvement with the use of child
labor in the production of soccer balls by publishing a picture of a child
assembling Nike soccer balls in Pakistan.22 More recently, underpaid
workers, including child workers, produced the soccer balls used in the
2010 World Cup.23 This case of corporate-related human rights abuse—
thirteen years after the initial Nike scandal—received only minimal media attention.
A 2007 U.N. study reviewed 320 alleged cases of corporate-related
human rights abuses and concluded that corporations affect “the full
range of human rights” through their acts or omissions.24 The study fo17. CCR, supra note 16.
18. JOSEPH, supra note 1, at 2; Protect, Respect & Remedy, supra note 13, at 2.
19. Comm’n on Human Rights, Subcomm’n on Promotion and Protection of Human Rights,
Rep. on its 55th Sess., July 28–Aug. 15, 2003, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26,
2003), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.Sub.2.2003.12
.Rev.2.En. The influence of transnational corporations is discussed infra in Part II.
20. See, e.g., Mark Gibney & R. David Emerick, The Extraterritorial Application of United
States Law and The Protection of Human Rights: Holding Multinational Corporations to Domestic
and International Standards, 10 TEMP. INT’ L & COMP. L.J. 123, 126–27 (1996) (discussing “the
vastly different standards that exist under U.S. law that give [transnational corporations from the
U.S.] license to treat U.S. citizens in one manner, but allow foreigners to be treated in a completely
different (and inferior) way”).
21. JOSEPH, supra note 1, at 2; Protect, Respect & Remedy, supra note 13, at 2.
22. Richard M. Locke, The Promise and Perils of Globalization: The Case of Nike 11–13
(Mass. Inst. of Tech. Indus. Performance Ctr. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 02-007, 2002),
available at http://web.mit.edu/ipc/publications/pdf/02-007.pdf.
23. See Michelle Chen, FIFA’s World Cup Having a Ball with Child Labor, COLOR LINES
(June 11, 2010, 10:42 AM), http://colorlines.com/archives/2010/06/south_africas_world_cup_brims
_with_broken_promises.html; James Rupert, World Cup Profits Bypass Asian Soccer-Ball Stitchers
(Update 1), BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 9, 2010, 4:39 AM), http://www.businessweek.com/
news/2010-06-09/world-cup-profits-bypass-asian-soccer-ball-stitchers-update1-.html; Trina Tocco,
World Cup Soccer Balls Missed the Goal Set 13 Years Ago: Child Labor, Poverty Wages, Temporary Workers, COMMONDREAMS.ORG (June 7, 2010, 10:46 AM), http://www.commondreams.org/
newswire/2010/06/07-6.
24. Protect, Respect & Remedy, supra note 13, at 1–3, 29. The cases were posted on the
Business and Human Rights Resource center webpage (http://www.business-humanrights.org),
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cused on the rights enumerated in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and International Labour Organization Core Conventions.25 These include
“civil and political rights; economic, social and cultural rights; and labor
rights.”26 The study found that corporate-related human rights abuses
take place in all industrial sectors and in all regions of the world.27 In
some cases, the harms include loss of life.28
Although corporate-related human rights abuses are not proportionately represented in the U.S. media, scholars and decision-makers are
aware of the issue.29 So, if scholars and decision-makers have been aware
of corporate-related human rights abuses for decades at the very least,
why are there still such wide-scale problems with corporations negatively affecting human rights? This Article argues that the answer is not
simply a lack of regulations or a lack of enforcement. Instead, it argues
that part of the answer lies in the conflation of human rights law with
international human rights law, and the ways that human rights law intersects with corporate law and foreign direct investment law.30
Addressing the complex problem of human rights abuses by transnational corporations requires a comprehensive framework.31 One avenue toward a comprehensive framework is international law; another
avenue is global law. International law is the law between nation-states

which “is the most comprehensive” and “objective” resource on the intersection of business and
human rights. Id. at 6.
25. Protect, Respect & Remedy, supra note 13, at 2. See generally ICCPR, supra note 4;
ICESCR, supra note 4; UDHR, supra note 14; INT’ L LABOUR OFFICE, THE I NTERNATIONAL
LABOUR ORGANIZATION’S FUNDAMENTAL CONVENTIONS 8 (2002), available at
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---declaration/documents/publication/wcms
_095895.pdf. There are eight core International Labour Organization conventions: Freedom of
Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87); Right to Organise
and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98); Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29);
Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105); Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No.
138); Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182); Equal Remuneration Convention,
1951 (No. 100); Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111). Id.
26. Protect, Respect & Remedy, supra note 13, at 2.
27. Id. Based on the cases reviewed in the U.N. study, the regional breakdown of alleged
human rights incidents is as follows: Asia & the Pacific – 28%; Africa – 22%; Latin America – 18%;
Global – 15%; North America – 7%; Europe – 3%; and Middle East – 2%. Id. at 8.
28. JOSEPH, supra note 1, at 2–4.
29. See generally, e.g., J OSEPH, supra note 1; Locke, supra note 22; Protect, Respect & Remedy, supra note 13.
30. For a parallel argument addressing the question of why transnational corporations do not
have obligations under international human rights law, see Iris Halpern, Tracing the Contours of
Transnational Corporations’ Human Rights Obligations in the Twenty-First Century, 14 BUFF.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 129, 131 (2008) (positing that the omission of transnational corporations is “a
product of the systemic separation between international economic development, human rights
enforcement, and the regulation of private players”).
31. See id. at 134 (“The international legal system must be refashioned so as to be capable of
simultaneously regulating all the numerous important actors vis-à-vis their human rights behavior.”).
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and, as such, it does not directly regulate transnational corporations.32
Instead, it regulates the regulators, the nation-states, thereby concentrating on nation-states and marginalizing issues that do not directly implicate nation-states.33 Since transnational corporations are (by definition)
not nation-states, they do not fall within the natural scope of international
law. Further, since transnational corporations operate in multiple jurisdictions, the laws of any one jurisdiction are not sufficient to govern their
activities.34
Global law is an emerging legal order. It is a next iteration of law,
following the law of nations and international law.35 Global law is neither superior nor inferior to other legal orders.36 Instead, it presupposes
the interconnection and interdependency of all legal orders of the world,
including international law and national law.37 Human rights are a core
value of global law.38 There are multiple sources of global law, including
specific economic or other subsectors, and organizational and functional
networks.39 Lex mercatoria, also known as commercial law, transnational
law, or the New Law Merchant, is an example of global law.40 Through
various means, global law provides an opportunity to address corporaterelated human rights abuses, in part because it is not state-centered.
This Article is part of a larger project. My previous article, Toward
Global Corporate Citizenship: Reframing Foreign Direct Investment
Law, argued that the asymmetry and fragmentation of foreign direct in-

32. See PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 1–2 (1956). As early as 1956, Philip Jessup
noted the inadequacy of using “international law” to address issues that arise within the “complex
interrelated world community.” Id. at 1. Instead, Jessup used the term “‘transnational law’ to include
all law which regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers.” Id. at 2 (“Both public and
private international law are included, as are other rules which do not wholly fit into such standard
categories.”). For a more detailed discussion of the term “transnational,” see generally id. Transnational law, thus, may regulate “individuals, corporations, states, organizations of states, or other
groups.” Id. at 2–3.
33. See id. at 11.
34. See id. at 4–5; see also Rachel J. Anderson, Toward Global Corporate Citizenship: Reframing Foreign Direct Investment Law, 18 MICH. ST. J. INT’ L L. 1, 2 (2009).
35. RAFAEL D OMINGO, THE NEW GLOBAL LAW, at xiv (2010); see also Harold J. Berman,
World Law, 18 FORDHAM I NT’ L L.J. 1617, 1617 (1995). For more on national human rights law, see
generally UNITED N ATIONS, BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A SURVEY OF NHRI PRACTICES
(2008), available at http://www.reports-and-materials.org/OHCHR-National-Human-RightsInstitutions-practices-Apr-2008.doc.
36. See DOMINGO, supra note 35, at 147.
37. Id.; see also Ralf Michaels, The True Lex Mercatoria: Law Beyond the State, 14 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447, 447 (2007) (arguing that “the dichotomy of anational law and state law
is false”).
38. DOMINGO, supra note 35 , at 142–44.
39. Gunther Teubner, ‘Global Bukowina’: Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in GLOBAL
LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3, 3–4 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997). See generally id. for a discussion of
global law.
40. Id. at 3. Lex mercatoria is also defined as “the transnational law of economic transactions.” Id.; see also ANA M. LÓPEZ RODRÍGUEZ, LEX MERCATORIA AND HARMONIZATION OF
CONTRACT LAW IN THE EU 90 (2003) (defining global law as “a body of rules, different in origin
and content, created by the community of merchants to serve the needs of international trade”).
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vestment law encourages excesses by transnational corporations.41 That
article proposed transforming the theories and practices of voluntary
Global Corporate Citizenship into a mandatory legal framework and developing a legal theory of Global Corporate Citizenship that reconceptualizes the role of transnational corporations in the global economy. This Article builds on Toward Global Corporate Citizenship and
attempts to reimagine human rights law.42 It argues for the development
of a global law regime as a sub-category of human rights law, distinct
from international human rights law, and proposes a global institution,
global laws, and global enforcement to regulate transnational corporations and help fill gaps in human rights law.43 This Article makes that
argument in three stages.
Part I, Limits of a State-Centered Human Rights Regime, argues for
the re-remembering of human rights law as the super-category and international human rights law as one of several possible sub-categories of
human rights law. In the wake of the dramatic expansion of international
human rights law in the post-World War II era, it came to be thought of
as synonymous with human rights law. This conflation of human rights
law and international human rights law has inhibited the development of
other sub-categories of human rights law such as global human rights
law and national human rights law. Although international human rights
law has achieved significant progress, the state-centered human rights
regime is limited, and, in the absence of other forms of human rights law,
leads to the under-regulation of transnational corporations as a result of
state resistance, impotency, and complicity. Part I proposes decoupling
and distinguishing between human rights law and international human
rights law to allow for the development of other forms of human rights
law, including global human rights law.
Part II, Transnational Corporations Need Dedicated Regulation,
posits that transnational corporations require dedicated regulation under
human rights law that goes beyond the ambit of international human
rights law. International human rights law requires states to enact and
enforce laws to protect human rights within their jurisdiction. However,
international human rights law alone is an insufficient tool with which to
regulate transnational corporations when their economic, political, and
41. See Anderson, supra note 34, at 6.
42. This article attempts to respond to the challenge identified by Philip Alston in The ‘Not-aCat’ Syndrome: Can the International Human Rights Regime Accommodate Non-State Actors?, in
NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 3, 4 (Philip Alston ed., 2005) (“The challenge that [the
state-centered focus of the international human rights regime] lays down is one of re-imagining, as
the social scientists would put it, the nature of the human rights regime and the relationships among
the different actors within it. Lawyers, not being noted for their willingness to depart from precedents, might prefer to see the task in terms for re-interpreting existing concepts and procedures rather
than re-imagining.”).
43. Sarah Joseph has argued, “Ultimately, a preferable approach might be for all nations to
agree on international minimum human rights standards for TNCs, which could be incorporated into
national legislation and enforced by domestic courts.” JOSEPH, supra note 1, at 153.
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legal influence exceeds that of the countries in which they operate. The
interests of states in preserving sovereignty inhibit the development of
comprehensive multijurisdictional international human rights enforcement mechanisms. Finally, the importance of human rights as core values
contrasted with the inadequacy of international human rights law as the
sole tool to protect them at the global level, demonstrate the need for
protection and enforcement of these rights in multiple forms of human
rights law.
Part III, Global Regulation of Transnational Corporations, sets out a
proposal for the development of global human rights law as a subcategory of human rights law that could address the problem of corporate-related human rights abuses. This proposal has three main components: creation of a Global Law Commission, development of global
laws, and implementation of universal civil jurisdiction. A primary purpose of the Global Law Commission would be to develop global human
rights law regulations and legislation to prevent and address corporaterelated human rights abuses. The Global Law Commission would develop model global regulations and laws informed by theories of Global
Corporate Citizenship and promote their enactment. Global regulations
and laws could be enforceable via multiple avenues, including national
courts, alternative dispute resolution, and universal civil jurisdiction for
corporate-related human rights abuses. However, this proposal does not
preclude the creation of a global court or other global mechanism for
adjudication or alternative dispute resolution.
I. LIMITS OF A STATE-CENTERED HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME
International human rights law categorizes all actors on the global
stage as either state actors or non-state actors.44 For the purposes of international human rights law, non-state actors can be defined only by
their relationship to the state.45 This state-centered focus inhibits an accurate analysis of corporate-related human rights abuses and limits the development of measures with which these issues can be addressed.46 In
light of these weaknesses, this Article argues for the development of
other forms of human rights law.
Although states are no longer assumed to be the only actors in the
international arena, modern human rights law remains state-centered.47
44. Alston, supra note 42, at 3.
45. Id. at 3–4.
46. See id. at 4 (“[S]uch a uni-dimensional or monochromatic way of viewing the world is not
only misleading, but also makes it much more difficult to adapt the human rights regime in order to
take adequate account of the fundamental changes that have occurred in recent years.”).
47. See Deva, supra note 2, at 1 (“The conventional international framework for protection of
human rights is state-centric; it obligates primarily states to promote, and not violate, human
rights.”); PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN I NTRODUCTION TO I NTERNATIONAL LAW 209
(7th ed. 1997) (“[E]very individual has certain inalienable and legally enforceable rights protecting
him or her against state interference and the abuse of power by governments.”); see also Rafael
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This means that when we think of human rights law, we think primarily
of international human rights law. Modern international human rights
law is anchored in the series of international declarations and conventions that were generated in the decades following the fall of the Third
Reich and the end of World War II.48 The atrocities perpetuated by the
Nazi state against its own citizens and those of other countries were still
fresh in the minds of the policy makers who organized the Nuremburg
trials and drafted and signed the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.49 This explains, in part, the post-World War II focus on state action.
However, although corporations were often complicit and, in many
cases, actively involved in human rights abuses under the Nazi regime
and in many other contexts, the emerging international human rights
regime did not incorporate direct rules governing transnational corporations.50 Although some argue that the primary focus of international decision-makers in the post-World War II period was responding to the
atrocities of the Nazi regime, the reasons more likely lie in the complexities of political machinations and conflicts of interest set in a particular
historical context.51 The exclusion of transnational corporations from
international human rights law is not inevitable, but rather results from
historical events, flawed assumptions, and lack of political will among
some influential policy makers.52

Domingo, The Crisis of International Law, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’ L L. 1543, 1549–50 (2009). For
a discussion of the nation-state paradigm and its history, see id. at 1556–66.
48. See Austen L. Parrish, Changing Territoriality, Fading Sovereignty, and Development of
Indigenous Rights, 31 AM. I NDIAN L. REV. 291, 296–97 (2007). The post-World War II period
marks the beginning of broad international action in the area of human rights. See MALANCZUK,
supra note 47, at 209. Prior to World War II, actions addressing human rights concerns tended to be
focused on specific regions, groups, or abuses. Id.
49. See LOUIS H ENKIN, THE A GE OF RIGHTS 1 (1990).
50. See Halpern, supra note 30, at 130–31.
51. See Mark Mazower, The Strange Triumph of Human Rights, 1933–1950, 47 HISTORICAL
J. 379, 380, 397 (2004) (“It does no service to the cause of human rights to disguise the political
struggles and conflicts of interest that accompanied their emergence into the international arena. On
the contrary, a better understanding of that story, their relationship to prior rights regimes, and their
dependence on the international balance of power may help us recognize their true weight and
worth.”); see also Kenneth Cmiel, The Recent History of Human Rights, 109 AM. HIST. REV. 117,
119 (2004) (“While university-based historians such as Paul Lauren, Lynn Hunt, and Jeffrey
Wasserstrom have addressed the subject, journalists, legal scholars, political activists, and political
scientists have still done far more of this history writing. The field remains refreshingly inchoate.”).
52. See ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 111–14 (2004) (arguing that modern international law is deeply and fundamentally shaped by imperialism and colonialism). Colonial trading companies, the predecessors of
modern transnational corporations, were arms of the state and, therefore, did not require a separate
body of governing law. Their purpose was to further political, legal, economic, and social goals. For
example, the Dutch West India Company was “started as a move in the war game” and “[t]he aim
and objective of the Company had from the first been to carry on active war with Spain.” Hugh E.
Egerton, The Transference of Colonial Power to the United Provinces and England 728, 749, in 4
THE CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY: THE THIRTY Y EARS’ WAR, 749 (A.W. Ward, G.W. Prothero &
Stanley Leathes eds., 1906). The shareholders of the Dutch West India Company were five Dutch
government institutions, the Dutch legislature made annual payment to the Dutch West India Com-
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Protected from the reach of international human rights law, transnational corporations continue to impinge upon human rights. The most
common labor-related rights that the operations of transnational corporations affect include “the right to work (34%), [the] right to just and favorable remuneration (30%), the right to a safe work environment (31%),
and the right to rest and leisure (25%).”53 For example, in the late 1990s,
an Ernst and Young54 report on a Nike subcontractor in Vietnam claimed
that concentrations of a chemical solvent, chemical releases, and excess
dust in the shoe plant (in each case, many multiples above the allowed
levels) had caused extensive harm to the workers’ human rights.55 Specifically, workers suffered from respiratory ailments and skin and heart
disease that were allegedly caused by the health and safety violations at
the factory.56 The Ernst and Young report also stated that the employees
were forced to work more hours than allowed by Vietnamese law.57
As mentioned above, not only do corporate-related human rights
abuses take place in the labor context, they are also linked to environmental harms. Those human rights affected include the right to physical
health and to an adequate standard of living, and the right to life, liberty
and personal security.58 Corporate-related human rights harms are often
caused by pollution, contamination, and environmental degradation.59
For example, the plaintiffs in Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC60 alleged that Rio
Tinto’s Panguna Mine in Papua New Guinea polluted the KawerongJaba River with waste and poisoned the air with dust and emissions from
a copper concentrator.61 The plaintiffs asserted that this air and water
pollution led to an increase in respiratory infections and asthma, and that
the decreased food supply due to crop damage and the deaths of traditional sources of food like fish led to health problems in the local populapany, and the Dutch legislature promised to provide the Dutch West India Company with a fleet of
ships in the event of a serious war. Id. at 749–50.
53. Protect, Respect & Remedy, supra note 13, at 11.
54. Ernst and Young is a global accounting firm that provides assurance, tax, transaction, and
advisory services. See About Us, ERNST AND YOUNG, http://www.ey.com/US/en/About-us (last
visited Oct. 28, 2010).
55. Locke, supra note 22, at 13; see also Steven Greenhouse, Nike Shoe Plant in Vietnam is
Called Unsafe for Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1997, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
1997/11/08/business/nike-shoe-plant-in-vietnam-is-called-unsafe-forworkers.html?scp=1&sq
=nike%20shoe%20plant%20in%20vietnam%20is%20called%20unsafe&st=cse.
56. Locke, supra note 22, at 13.
57. Greenhouse, supra note 55 (stating that employees were forced to work 65 hours a week
for $10). Over 9,000 workers were employed at the factory. Locke, supra note 22, at 13.
58. Protect, Respect & Remedy, supra note 13, at 2.
59. See id.
60. 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 456
F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2006), withdrawn and superseded on reh’g in part, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir.
2007), reh’g en banc granted, 499 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2007). On October 26, 2010, an en banc panel
of the Ninth Circuit referred the case to a mediator to “explore the possibility of mediation.” Sarei v.
Rio Tinto, 02-cv-56256 (9th Cir. Oct. 26, 2010). The mediator is scheduled “to report to the en banc
court within twenty-eight (28) days as to whether mediation should proceed or whether this case
should be returned to the en banc court.” Id.
61. Id. at 1124 & n.31.
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tion.62 Corporate-related human rights abuses harm not only individuals
but also entire communities.63
In addition to direct abuses such as under-compensation or chemical
spills, abuses by transnational corporations create ripple effects that lead
to additional harms.64 For example, exploitative compensation practices
can contribute to harassment and sexual abuse of women.65 The use of
child labor affects enjoyment of the right to education and, in some
cases, the rights to health and even life.66 By way of illustration, children
between the ages of five and seventeen are employed at vanilla orchards
in Madagascar.67 They are among the twenty-eight percent of children in
Madagascar who are employed in the agriculture and fishing industries.68
These children are unable to enjoy the right to education because they
work six to seven hours a day for approximately twelve cents a day.69
Corporations also contribute to or benefit from indirect involvement
in human rights abuses by third parties—including governments, other
businesses, and individuals.70 For example, the Swedish Company
Lundin Oil AB, together with Sudapet Ltd.—which is wholly owned by
the Sudanese government—has been accused of complicity in war
crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrated by government security
forces.71 Most of the indirect cases are alleged in Africa, Asia and the
Pacific, Latin America, and the Middle East.72
Even though we tend to think of human rights in terms of international human rights law—that is, in a post-1948, post-Universal Declaration of Human Rights context—human dignity and other concepts underlying human rights predate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and even predate the nation state. Louis Henken,73 a leading international
62. Id.
63. Protect, Respect & Remedy, supra note 13, at 4, 29.
64. Id. at 3, 29.
65. Lewis, supra note 5, at 519 (“Transnational corporations exploit the low-wage status of
women (often women of color) and, in doing so, create new avenues for sexual abuse and harassment.”); see also Nike Admits Abuse at Indonesian Plants, BBC NEWS (Feb. 22, 2001, 13:55 GMT),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1184103.stm (reporting that underpaid workers in a Nike
plant in Indonesia, who are 85% women, have reported being coerced into sex and being fondled by
managers).
66. Protect, Respect & Remedy, supra note 13, at 3.
67. Dan McDougall, Bitter Plight of the Vanilla Trade Children, THE SUNDAY TIMES (Mar.
14, 2010), http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/africa/article7060962.ece.
68. Id.
69. See id.
70. Protect, Respect & Remedy, supra note 13, at 4.
71. EUROPEAN COAL. ON OIL IN SUDAN, U NPAID DEBT: THE LEGACY OF LUNDIN, PETRONAS
AND OMV IN B LOCK 5A, SUDAN 1997-2003, at 10 (2010), available at http://www.ecosonline.org/
reports/2010/UNPAID_DEBT_fullreportweb.pdf. (“[T]here are grounds to investigate whether the
Consortium provided financial and material support to the security agencies that were responsible
for the commission of international crimes and gross violations of human rights.”).
72. Protect, Respect & Remedy, supra note 13, at 15.
73. Louis Henkin (1917-2010) was a professor of law at Columbia University, a president of
the American Society of International Law, and held many important positions over the course of his
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law and human rights scholar, defined human rights as “legitimate, valid,
[and] justified claims” of individuals and communities upon society.74
Although human rights are claims or entitlements that can be asserted,
they are not always coexistent with legal rights.75 Human rights arise on
the basis of a person’s humanity and do not require anything more than
the nature of a human being to exist; legal rights are government created
and require a government or other institutional act to exist.76 Thus, human rights may exist, even when law does not yet protect them.
A. Underregulation of Transnational Corporations
Modern human rights law does not generally directly regulate transnational corporations. International human rights agreements are—by
definition—agreements between nation-states.77 International human
rights documents range from recording understandings of human rights
and human dignity, to setting out aspirational goals, to establishing requirements and guidelines for state actors.78 The idea is that state signatories of international agreements will enact laws that protect human
rights.79 Such laws would also apply to domestic and transnational corporations where appropriate.80
The exclusion of transnational corporations from the international
human rights regime puts the burden on states to enact and enforce laws
that protect human rights.81 However, this expectation, although arguably
correct in principle, does not account for realities that make state en-

life, including at the State Department, the United Nations, and the Permanent Court of Arbitration.
Louis Henkin, COLUM. L. SCH., http://www.law.columbia.edu/fac/Louis_Henkin (last visited Dec.
20, 2010). Henkin was a prolific and influential scholar and was “credited with founding the study of
human rights law and inspiring generations of legal scholars.” Louis Henkin: Preeminent Scholar in
Constitutional
and
International
Law,
COLUM.
L.
SCH.,
http://www.law.columbia.edu/louis_henkin/55703 (last visited Dec. 20, 2010).
74. HENKIN, supra note 49, at 2; see also id. at 2–5 (providing a more detailed discussion of
this conception of human rights); Rubin, supra note 14, at 9 (“[H]uman rights must be rights, that is,
they must represent some claim or entitlement that can be asserted by the human beings in question.”).
75. See Rubin, supra note 14, at 9 for a discussion of the difference between human rights and
legal rights.
76. See id. at 8–9.
77. See Domingo, supra note 47, at 1549 (quoting HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 320
(Max Knight trans., 1967)).
78. For example, at the time it was passed by the United Nations General Assembly, most
states did not regard the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as legally binding. MALANCZUK,
supra note 47, at 213. However, in the time since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was
passed some of its provisions may have become binding customary international law. Id. (discussing
the resolution passed at the United Nations Conference on Human Rights at Teheran in 1968 “proclaiming, inter alia, that ‘the Universal Declaration of Human Rights . . . constitutes an obligation for
the members of the international community.’” (alteration in original)).
79. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 2; ICESCR, supra note 4, art. 2.
80. See Dinah Shelton, Protecting Human Rights in a Globalized World, 25 B.C. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 273, 305 (2002) (suggesting that, under the ICESCR, states will be held responsible
for controlling non-state actors “over which they exercise jurisdiction”).
81. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 2; ICESCR, supra note 4, art. 2.
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forcement improbable at best and completely unrealistic at worst.82 For
example, developing countries have a disincentive to enact and enforce
laws to protect human rights and remedy abuses because “developing
countries compete among themselves for a limited pool of investment.”83
This environment of competition leads governments to make different
choices about legislation and enforcement than might be the case if they
were working in concert with other governments.84 This situation leaves
transnational corporations under-regulated.
Under-regulation of transnational corporations is problematic because it encourages decision-making that results in corporate-related
human rights abuses.85 Although transnational corporations are subject to
the laws of multiple jurisdictions, the decisions that guide the acts of
transnational corporations are, in practice, rarely exposed to judicial
scrutiny.86 Only a small percentage of alleged corporate-related abuses
make it into court, and even fewer result in an outcome that would create
incentives for corporations to change their business practices to reduce
negative effects on human rights.87
There are at least five ways to address the problem of corporaterelated human rights abuses: laws, pressure by consumers and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), self-regulation, socially responsible
investment, and enforcement.88 These can be categorized into legal and
non-legal remedies. Nonetheless, in their current forms, each of these
avenues is insufficient.
Legal measures include legislation and litigation. While domestic
and international laws do exist, they are fragmented and are often not
enforced.89 In addition, many plaintiffs do not have the financial resources to pursue legal remedies. As a result, most cases of alleged violations never make it to court. Reaching a settlement often first requires the
incentive of a pending court case. Even then, there is a possibility that

82. See Deva, supra note 2, at 3 (“[T]he approach of indirect regulation has failed to deliver
the desired results.”); Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 448 (2001) (“Without some international legal standards, we will
likely continue to witness both excessive claims made against such actors for their responsibility and
counterclaims by corporate actors against such accountability.”).
83. Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity
of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 639, 674 (1998).
84. See id. (suggesting that the environment of competition influences the policies adopted by
developing countries).
85. See JOSEPH, supra note 1, at 153 (arguing that measures are needed to incentivize transnational corporations to adopt better practices with regard to human rights).
86. See id. (explaining that the human rights abuses by transnational corporations actually
subjected to transnational litigation represent “only the tip of the iceberg”).
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 8–12.
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the plaintiffs may not meet all jurisdictional, substantive, and evidentiary
hurdles—which are often substantial in these types of cases.90
Non-legal measures can contribute to filling the gaps in law and enforcement. These measures include external incentives, such as public
pressure and socially responsible investment, and internal incentives,
such as self-regulation.91 Pressure by consumers and NGOs has achieved
some high profile successes.92 However, this option is limited by the
need for abuses to be sufficiently widespread or public, or both, to come
to the attention of consumers and NGOs, at which point substantial
harms have often already occurred.93 Socially responsible investment
offers shareholders an opportunity to avoid financing transnational corporations with questionable practices.94 However, socially responsible
investment itself does not prevent other people from investing in companies that are less socially responsible. In addition, the effectiveness of
socially responsible investment remains disputed.95
The good works for goodwill model underlies more recent developments in scholarship such as corporate citizenship and enlightened
shareholder value.96 The essence of the good works for goodwill model
is that, although good works may be more costly from a short-term perspective, they have a beneficial effect on profits from a long-term perspective.97 The good works for goodwill model harkens back to issues
raised in cases like Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,98 A.P. Smith Manufactur-

90. For a discussion of some of these hurdles, see Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social
Responsibility in an Era of Economic Globalization, 35 U.C. D AVIS L. REV. 705, 764–71 (2002).
91. JOSEPH, supra note 1, at 153.
92. See Halpern, supra note 30, at 135 (“Currently, the most acute pressure felt by TNCs to
modify their behavior results from concerted NGO and consumer action campaign activity.”).
93. For example, in the Nike case, the underpayment of the workers in Indonesia “became
publicized through the skillful use of media by several NGOs” and reported in “The New Republic,
Rolling Stone, The New York Times, Foreign Affairs, and The Economist.” Locke, supra note 22, at
10–11. However, this practice had gone on for several years before it was brought to the attention of
the public. See id. (noting that the practice was taking place in the early 1990s and was not discontinued until the mid-1990s). For a discussion of other examples of successful applications of pressure by consumers and NGOs, see id. at 18–19.
94. See Michael S. Knoll, Ethical Screening in Modern Financial Markets: The Conflicting
Claims Underlying Socially Responsible Investment, 57 BUS. LAW. 681, 690 (2002).
95. See PAUL HAWKEN & THE N ATURAL CAPITAL INSTITUTE, SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE
INVESTING: HOW THE SRI INDUSTRY H AS FAILED TO RESPOND TO PEOPLE WHO WANT TO INVEST
WITH CONSCIENCE AND WHAT C AN B E DONE TO CHANGE I T 16 (2004) [hereinafter HAWKEN &
NCI],
available
at
http://www.community-wealth.org/_pdfs/articles-publications/sri/reportharkin.pdf.
96. See generally DAVID LOGAN, D ELWIN ROY & LAURIE REGELBRUGGE, G LOBAL
CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP: RATIONALE AND STRATEGIES (1997) (discussing Global Corporate Citizenship); David Millon, Enlightened Shareholder Value, Social Responsibility, and the Redefinition
of Corporate Purpose Without Law (Wash. & Lee Pub. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper
No. 2010-11, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1625750
(discussing enlightened shareholder value).
97. See Millon, supra note 96, at 1–2.
98. 170 N.W. 668, 683–84 (Mich. 1919) (examining when shareholders challenged the
authority of the board of directors to prioritize philanthropic contributions over profit maximization).

File: Anderson_FinalProof_12711.doc

2010]

Created on: 1/27/11 6:12 PM

REIMAGINING HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

Last Printed: 1/28/11 7:16 AM

197

ing Co. v. Barlow,99 and Shlensky v. Wrigley100 with which U.S. law students and corporate law scholars alike are familiar.101 The good works
for goodwill model essentially shifts the framework from a short-term to
a long-term emphasis but retains a focus on profit-maximization as a
primary goal.102
Finally, the level of judicial review of business decisions in the
United States has global implications because approximately one-fifth of
the top 100 non-financial transnational corporations are located in the
United States. Currently, the main forum for corporate-related human
rights abuse cases is also the United States.103 U.S. courts subscribe to a
doctrine of minimal judicial review of the substance of business decisions called the business judgment rule.104 This rule presents a particularly problematic hurdle for enforcement in cases of corporate-related
human rights abuses because it means that they, too, are subjected to
only minimal judicial review.
B. State Resistance, Impotency, and Complicity
To date, international human rights law has had a limited trickledown effect on corporate-related human rights abuses. Not all countries
have signed on to all international human rights agreements. For example, the United States has ratified only seventeen of fifty-one international human rights agreements, and five of the agreements ratified by
the United States relate to terrorism.105 In addition, ratification of an in99. 98 A.2d 581, 585–87 (N.J. 1953) (discussing shareholders who challenged the authority of
the board of directors to make a contribution to a university).
100. 237 N.E.2d 776, 778 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (discussing shareholders that challenged the
authority of the board of directors to act “for a reason or reasons contrary and wholly unrelated to the
business interests of the corporation”).
101. It is worth noting here that Geoffrey P. Miller argues that although the narratives of these
situations are often told as charitable corporate giving cases, these narratives did not accurately
reflect the underlying motives and issues in these cases. See generally Geoffrey P. Miller, Narrative
and Truth in Judicial Opinions: Corporate Charitable Giving Cases (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law Pub.
Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 09-56, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1495069.
102. See generally Millon, supra note 96, at 4 (discussing corporate purpose and the shift from
short-term shareholder value to be broadened to encompass nonshareholder interest as well).
103. JOSEPH, supra note 1, at 21 (“Most of the transnational human rights cases against corporations have arisen under the Alien Tort Claims Act [ATCA] in the United States.”). However, the
ability to bring claims against corporations under the Alien Tort Statute was recently called into
question in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 149 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that (1)
customary international law governs the scope of Alien Tort Statute liability, (2) in matters of first
impression, the Alien Tort Statute does not confer jurisdiction over claims against corporations, and
(3) corporate defendants were not subject to Alien Tort Statue liability because corporations were
not subject to liability under customary international law).
104. The business judgment rule is based on the presumption that directors possess more expertise than judges when it comes to making business decisions and so should not be second-guessed
by judges as long as appropriate procedures have been followed in the decision-making process. See,
e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 361–62 (Del.Ch. 2000); Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812–13 (Del. 1984); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 782 (Del.
1981).
105. See Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties – USA, U. MINN. H UM. RTS.
LIBR., http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/research/ratification-USA.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2010).
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ternational human rights agreement does not automatically ensure that a
country will enact comprehensive laws to implement the agreements to
which it is a party.106
Further, even if enacted, such laws may not achieve the goals of the
agreement under which they were mandated. For example, the United
States ratified the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) in 1994.107 However, in its October 2000 report on efforts made to implement the CERD, the U.S. government admitted that enactment of laws has been insufficient to fulfill
the goals of the CERD.108
There are numerous factors that affect states’ ability to protect human rights.109 These include historical, economic, and institutional constraints as well as weak legal systems, regime change, wars, politics, and
geopolitical power plays.110 Some states—for example, failed states
(states that have collapsed and can no longer perform basic functions)—
are unable to protect human rights.111 In some cases, developing countries do not have the political will or legal processes to protect human
rights.112
In other cases, states actively resist the development, implementation, and enforcement of the international human rights regime.113 Even
at the inception of the modern international human rights regime, politi106. See Mazower, supra note 51, at 379 (“To many people, [human rights] are honoured in
the breach, an ideal which statesmen pay lip-service to but flout in practice.”).
107. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), Reports Submitted by States
Paties Under Article 9 of the Convention: Third Periodic Reports of States Due in 1999, ¶ 3, U.N.
Doc. CERD/C/351/Add.1 (Oct. 10, 2000) [hereinafter United States 2000 CERD Report], available
at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/100294.pdf (combining the first three periodic
reports of the United States). It may seem surprising that the United States has ratified CERD since
the United States has not ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. See Ratification of International
Human Rights Treaties – USA, U. MINN. HUM. RTS. LIBR., http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/research
/ratification-USA.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2010). It is worth noting that this exception—U.S.
ratification of an international human rights agreement—was prompted by the very public presentation of petition to the United Nations in 1947 by W.E.B. Du Bois on behalf of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. Mazower, supra note 51, at 395.
108. United States 2000 CERD Report, supra note 108, at 18–21. Reasons given in the report
for the inadequate implementation of the CERD include inadequate enforcement of existing laws,
inefficient use of data, economic disparities, and lack of access to educational opportunities, technology, and high technology skills. Id. at 19–20. In addition, the report notes that persistent discrimination is a primary factor affecting the implementation of laws designed to eliminate discrimination. Id. at 19–21. Ironic. However, it is worth noting that the section on factors affecting implementation has been reduced to less than a page in the 2007 report and no longer gives discrimination
as a reason for persistent discrimination despite the enactment of laws. See Periodic Report of the
U.S., U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Periodic Report of the U.S., ¶¶ 52–
54 (April 2007), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/83517.pdf.
109. See Randall Peerenboom, Human Rights and Rule of Law: What’s the Relationship?, 36
GEO. J. INT’L L. 809, 943–44 (2005).
110. See id.
111. See id. at 858.
112. JOSEPH, supra note 1, at 11.
113. See Mazower, supra note 51, at 393.
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cal decision-makers attempted to limit the scope, implementation, and
enforcement of international human rights law.114 For example, during
the establishment of the United Nations in the 1940s, the U.S. Congress
actively took steps to protect U.S. domestic jurisdiction and prevent direct applicability of the U.N. Charter’s human rights provisions.115
As a result of U.S. and British concerns about national jurisdiction,
a domestic jurisdiction clause was incorporated into the U.N. Charter.116
Article 2 of the U.N. Charter states that “[n]othing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall
require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter.”117 The inclusion of this domestic jurisdiction clause effectively circumscribed the ability of the U.N. Charter to serve as a direct
basis for effective implementation and enforcement of the emerging
post-World War II international human rights regime.118
The state-centered focus of international human rights law relegates
to the periphery complex relationships between public and private actors—as well as relationships between private actors, and individuals and
communities.119 For example, the real and perceived need for foreign
capital creates incentives for states to establish an investment climate that
is attractive to transnational corporations.120 In response, states that are
looking to foreign direct investment to provide capital and know-how for
infrastructure development may choose not to monitor or enforce laws
and regulations that would increase the cost of operating within their
borders.121
In some cases, states are also complicit in corporate-related human
rights abuses122 and, therefore, have a disincentive to implement and enforce protection from and remedies for human rights abuses. For example, in response to the Niger Delta disasters discussed above, Ken SaroWiwa, a businessman, novelist, television producer, and former government official, spoke out against land appropriation, pollution, and other
alleged negative effects of the acts of multinational oil companies, including Royal Dutch/Shell.123 In November 1995, Ken Saro-Wiwa and
114. See id. (“The higher human rights moved up the agenda, the greater the pressure for a
further limitation on the new [United Nation]’s ability to intervene in the domestic affairs of member
states.” (emphasis added)).
115. See id.
116. See id. at 393.
117. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.
118. See Mazower, supra note 51, at 393 (discussing how Article 2 undermined the scope and
effectiveness of the U.N. Charter’s ability to serve as the basis for an effective human rights regime).
119. See Hope Lewis, Transnational Dimensions of Racial Identity: Reflecting on Race, the
Global Economy, and the Human Rights Movement at 60, 24 MD. J. INT’L L. 296, 306 (2009).
120. See id. at 306–07.
121. See id.
122. See generally Wiwa Fifth Amended Complaint, supra note 16.
123. See id. at 2.
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five other men were beaten, and denied food, water and bedding for several days.124 On November 10, 1995, the six men were hanged after a
“special military trial” based on fabricated charges.125 The Royal Dutch
Shell consortium had knowledge of these acts and gave its consent and
support.126 Royal Dutch/Shell made payments to the military police, contracted for the purchase of weapons supplied to the Nigerian police and
military, exchanged information with and provided logistical support to
the Nigerian police and military, and participated in the planning and
coordination of raids and terror campaigns in Ogoni and the Niger
Delta.127 At one point, the Nigerian subsidiary, a member of the Royal
Dutch Shell consortium, publicly praised the working relationship between the subsidiary and the Nigerian Police Force.128
Even in cases in which states are not acting in collusion with transnational corporations, the state-centered human rights regime does not
provide sufficient incentives for transnational corporations to respect
human rights. In the 2007 U.N. study of cases of alleged corporaterelated human rights abuses discussed above, two of the main contexts in
which transnational corporations impinged upon human rights were labor
and the environment.129 In most of the cases reviewed in the U.N. study,
each alleged instance of corporate-related human rights abuse affected at
least one hundred people, and the numbers were often much higher.130
For example, in one case, one alleged instance of corporate-related human rights abuse affected approximately 60,000 people.131
Although the international human rights regime has made progress
since the United Nations General Assembly adopted the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, state resistance continues to inhibit development of an implementable and enforceable human rights regime domestically and internationally.132 States, which bear the responsibility for
implementing and enforcing international human rights law, fail to ade124. See id. at 3, 17.
125. Id. (“Defendants Royal Dutch/Shell, together with the military regime governing Nigeria,
acting through the Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited . . . , and acting with
other agents and co-conspirators have, in the past and continuing through the present, used force and
intimidation to silence any opposition to their activities in Nigeria which includes the exploitation of
the petroleum resources of the Delta and spoliation of the environment there.”).
126. Id. at 2 (“The executions of Ken Saro-Wiwa, John Kpuinen, Saturday Doobee, Felix
Nuate, Daniel Gbokoo, and Dr. Barinem Kiobel and the imprisonment and torture of Michael Tema
Vizor by the Nigerian military junta and the campaign to falsely accuse them were carried out with
the knowledge, consent, and/or support of Defendants Royal Dutch Petroleum Company and Shell
Transport and Trading Company, p.l.c., . . . and their agents and officers, as part of a pattern of
collaboration and/or conspiracy between [Royal Dutch/Shell] and the military junta of Nigeria to
violently and ruthlessly suppress any opposition to Royal Dutch/Shell’s conduct in its exploitation of
oil and natural gas resources in Ogoni and in the Niger Delta.”).
127. See id. at 8–9.
128. Id. at 13.
129. Protect, Respect & Remedy, supra note 13, at 2.
130. Id. at 13–14.
131. Id. at 13.
132. See Peerenboom, supra note 109, at 824.
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quately do so. At the same time, the focus on international human rights
law diverts attention and energy that could be used to develop alternative
areas of human rights law. State resistance takes many forms including
non-ratification, reservations to international agreements, noncompliance, and even withdrawal from international agreements.133 The
extent to which states make reservations to international human rights
treaties undermines the effectiveness of those treaties.134
C. Extraterritorial Application of Domestic Law
The combination of sovereignty and territorial integrity imbues
states with jurisdiction within a state’s territories.135 Generally, under
modern international law, sovereign states have the jurisdiction to make
and enforce laws within their own territories.136 This also means that,
generally, states may not interfere in affairs that are within the jurisdiction of another state or in another state’s exercise of its authority within
its jurisdiction.137
States also exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction.138 In fact, there is an
increasing trend toward extraterritoriality.139 Familiar examples include
exterritorial application of antitrust, securities, and merger and takeover
laws.140 However, the extraterritorial application of domestic laws is
problematic.141 For example, the checks and balances that develop out of
mutual obligations, such as those embodied in international treaties, do
not constrain extraterritorial application of domestic law.142 Individual
nations are able to use their domestic laws to influence international policy in a non-transparent manner.143 Such laws are not first subjected to

133. Id.
134. See id. However, ratification alone is not inherently correlated with increased protections
for human rights.
135. For a discussion of sovereignty, territoriality, and jurisdiction, see Domingo, supra note
47, at 1556–76.
136. See PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION LAW:
THE SEARCH FOR A N EW CORPORATE PERSONALITY 175 (1993).
137. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.
138. See BLUMBERG, supra note 136, at 175–77 (discussing the bases for extraterritoriality).
Blumberg differentiates between home and host country territoriality. Id. at 177–91. For examples of
home and host country extraterritoriality, see generally id. For a brief history of extraterritorial
jurisdiction in the international criminal context, see Christopher L. Blakesley & Dan E. Stigall, The
Myopia of U.S. v. Martinelli: Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in the 21st Century, 39 GEO. WASH. INT’ L
L. REV. 1, 3–11 (2007).
139. Austen L. Parrish, Reclaiming International Law from Extraterritoriality, 93 MINN. L.
REV. 815, 818 (2009). For a discussion of U.S. attempts to regulate transnational corporations, see
Mark B. Baker, Tightening the Toothless Vise: Codes of Conduct and the American Multinational
Enterprise, 20 WIS. INT’L L.J. 89, 107–18 (2001).
140. BLUMBERG, supra note 136, at 192–93.
141. See Parrish, supra note 139, at 820.
142. Id. at 846. For a response to arguments that extraterritorial laws encourage international
lawmaking, see id. at 871–72.
143. See id. at 846, 857, 860, 862.
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public debate and discourse at the global level, which poses a threat to
democratic sovereignty and to international cooperation and stability.144
The extraterritorial application of domestic law also tends to make
enforcement of human rights dependent on private litigation.145 On its
face, private litigation has certain benefits because it affords potential
plaintiffs an opportunity to pursue a remedy for their harms. However, as
mentioned above, many plaintiffs do not have the significant financial
resources necessary to pursue remedies through private litigation. Further, even if private litigants have the resources to successfully pursue
litigation against a corporation, there is no guarantee that those plaintiffs
would have the financial resources to enforce the judgment. After all,
large transnational corporations have comparatively infinite time and
resources with which to oppose litigation and the enforcement of judgments.
In addition, “[e]xtraterritorial laws undermine international
law . . . .”146 Domestic litigation can divert energy toward short-fixes
with limited scope that could be better concentrated on working toward
comprehensive laws and enforcement with long-term effects.147 For example, when decisions are not recognized and enforced abroad, battles
won in one domestic court must then be re-litigated over and over again
in all of the jurisdictions around the world to achieve truly international
protections and remedies.
The state-centered human rights regime is characterized by an emphasis on domestic jurisdiction.148 Thus, laws governing the protection
and enforcement of human rights are at the whim of the prevailing political will or lack thereof in any given country at any given time. Arguably,
it might be possible to fill gaps in the human rights protections and enforcement of one country with the extraterritorial application of the domestic laws of another country. However, as this Part I demonstrated,
such extraterritorial application of domestic law is problematic and can
undermine the international human rights law regime.149
This Part I highlighted the weaknesses of the state-centered international human rights regime and its inability to respond to the realities of

144. See id.
145. See id. at 862–63.
146. Id. at 865. However, this is not to suggest that the territorial jurisdiction of a state is holy
and should be protected from any and all encroachments. See BLUMBERG, supra note 136, at 201
(“[T]he extraterritorial assertion of national law inherent in the application of enterprise principles to
components of multinational groups inevitably will engender international confrontation and disrupt
international trade and relations.”); Domingo, supra note 47, at 1575–76 (arguing that universal
harms should be resolved in a universal way).
147. See Parrish, supra note 139, at 865–66.
148. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.
149. See Parrish, supra note 139, at 865–66.
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modern transnational corporations.150 State resistance, impotency, and
complicity lead to under-protection of human rights.151 Extraterritorial
application of domestic laws is insufficient to fill these gaps and can
have far-reaching detrimental effects.152 Although the weaknesses of the
existing regime are well-known and well-documented, the question of
how to comprehensively address these issues remains unanswered.
This Article argues that this question is unanswered largely because
the conflation of human rights law and international human rights law
has inhibited the evolution of human rights law in other directions. The
development of new forms of human rights law could address the underprotection of human rights that results from an over-reliance on international human rights law. One issue that new forms of human rights law
could address is corporate-related human rights abuse. Part II argues that
human rights law should be extended directly to transnational corporations because the intersection of human rights and transnational corporate activity is special and, therefore, requires a specialized regulatory
regime.
II. TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS NEED DEDICATED REGULATION
Alternative forms of human rights law are needed because international human rights law is inadequate to enact and enforce comprehensive protections from corporate-related human rights abuses. The intersection of transnational corporations and human rights presents particular
challenges which existing legal regimes are ill-equipped to regulate. One
reason for this is the combination of the nature of transnational operations and the importance of human rights. Many transnational corporations have achieved a level of wealth and influence that strain the regulatory competence of nation-states.153 Transnational corporations operate
and cause or contribute to harms in multiple jurisdictions, which challenges the effectiveness of traditional territorial jurisdiction. Finally, human rights represent a special set of societal values that require a level of
regulation that may exceed those deemed sufficient in other areas of the
law. This Part II analyzes each of these characteristics of corporaterelated effects on human rights in turn.

150. See Erika R. George, The Place of the Private Transnational Actor in International Law:
Human Rights Norms, Development Aims, and Understanding Corporate Self-Regulation as Soft
Law, 101 AM. SOC’ Y INT’ L L. PROC. 473, 474 (2007).
151. See Peerenboom, supra note 109, at 943–44.
152. See Parrish, supra note 139, at 866.
153. See generally JOEL BALKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF
PROFIT AND POWER 3 (2004) (examining the strength and wealth of transnational corporations).
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A. Wealth and Influence of Transnational Corporations
Transnational corporations have achieved vast wealth and immense
influence.154 They exercise economic, political, and legal influence in
home countries, the country of incorporation, and host countries—the
country in which assets or operations are located.155 This exercise of influence inhibits the ability of states to prevent and redress corporaterelated human rights abuses.156
1. Economic Might of Transnational Corporations
Foreign direct investment, which takes the form of owning, operating, or managing a business in host countries, is an important component
of transnational corporations’ operations.157 States allow foreign direct
investment by transnational corporations within their borders for a variety of reasons. Two of the main reasons that host countries allow—and
more importantly encourage—foreign direct investment are to gain infusions of capital and know-how in the short term and to achieve economic
prosperity in the long term.158
In 2007, there were approximately 77,000 transnational corporations.159 The foreign assets of the top twenty transnational corporations
amounted to over $2,904,995 million.160 The majority of the largest
transnational corporations are incorporated in more developed countries.161 However, at least since the European occupation of Africa and
other former colonies, transnational corporations have chosen to own,
operate, and manage business operations in countries in which they are
not incorporated, and they continue to do so today in increasing numbers.162 In some cases, the wealth of a transnational corporation may ex-

154. See generally United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, The Universe of the
Largest Transnational Corporations, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2007/2 (2007) [hereinafter
UNCTAD], available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiia20072_en.pdf (compiling a list of the
100 largest non-financial transnational corporations and the top fifty transnational corporations from
developing countries).
155. Jernej Letnar Cernic, Corporate Human Rights Obligations under Stabilization Clauses,
11 GER. L.J. 210, 218 (2010); see also Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 962–63 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the ability of corporations to exert
political influence through political speech and election contributions).
156. Cernic, supra note 155, at 211.
157. UNCTAD, supra note 154, at 3 (stating that 770,000 foreign affiliates of transnational
corporations have globally generated an estimated $4.5 trillion in value since the early 1990’s).
158. Padma Mallampally & Karl P. Sauvant, Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries, FINANCE & DEVELOPMENT, Mar. 1999, at 34–36, available at http://www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/fandd/1999/03/pdf/mallampa.pdf.
159. UNCTAD, supra note138, at 3.
160. Id. at 40.
161. Id. at 4. The European Union, Japan, and the United States are the home countries for
eighty-five percent of the top one hundred transnational corporations. Id. The number of transnational corporations incorporated in less developed economies is growing but only a handful have
entered the ranks of the world’s largest. Id. at 15–16.
162. See Cernic, supra note 155, at 211.
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ceed the wealth of the host country itself.163 The wealth of transnational
corporations gives them room to influence the abuse or enjoyment of
human rights by individuals and communities in both home and host
countries.164
2. The Siren Song of Foreign Direct Investment
Foreign direct investment by transnational corporations is considered to be a significant source of private external financing for developing countries.165 In 2008, approximately forty-three percent of all inward
foreign direct investment flowed into transitional and developing countries.166 Foreign direct investment is also important to developing countries as an opportunity for innovation, technology transfer, human capacity development, and access to various forms of corporate governance.167
The need (real or perceived) for foreign capital makes many host countries dependent on it for development and, therefore, susceptible to the
influence of transnational corporations.168
In addition to potential economic benefits, foreign direct investment
by transnational corporations also exerts socio-cultural, political, and
legal influence in host countries.169 In some countries, transnational corporations may reinforce gender hierarchies by paying, or allowing their
subsidiaries to pay, women less than men for the same work.170 The effects of foreign direct investment may also be indirect and unexpected.
Between 1989 and 1992 in Papua New Guinea, for example, increased
income resulting from foreign direct investment was linked to increased
163. Halpern, supra note 30, at 144 (“[T]he process of economic globalization has allowed
many TNCs to accumulate vast sums of resources and power, often times in excess of the host
state’s own.”); see also Baker, supra note 139, at 94.
164. JOSEPH, supra note 1, at 1–2.
165. Mallampally & Sauvant, supra note 158, at 35; see also, United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development, World Investment Directory: Volume X Africa 2008, at 1, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2007/5 (2008), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit20075_en.pdf
(“The ratio of FDI inflows to the region’s gross fixed capital formation . . . [was] 20 per cent in
2006.”).
166. See Inward & Outward Foreign Direct Investment Flows, UNCTADSTAT,
http://unctadstat.unctad.org/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=88 (last visited Oct. 29, 2010)
(calculated using 2008 data available on UNCTADSTAT).
167. Mallampally & Sauvant, supra note 158, at 35–36.
168. See id. at 36.
169. Baker, supra note 139, at 89 (“[Transnational corporations are] potentially more economically powerful than Stalin’s Soviet Union, and with more broad-based political influence than The
Third Reich.”).
170. See U.N. Secretary-General, The World’s Women 2005: Progress in Statistics, 54, U.N.
Doc. ST/ESA/STAT/SER.K/17 (2006), available at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products
/indwm/ww2005_pub/English/WW2005_text_complete_BW.pdf. For a discussion of the gendered
effects of foreign direct investment, see generally Rachel J. Anderson, Foreign Direct Investment
and Distributional Equity for Women, 31 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. (forthcoming 2010). See also
Darren Rosenblum, Feminizing Capital: A Corporate Imperative, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 55, 74–80
(2009) for a more comprehensive discussion of women’s work and DOUGLAS BRANSON, NO SEAT
AT THE T ABLE: H OW CORPORATE G OVERNANCE AND L AW KEEP W OMEN OUT OF THE BOARDROOM
(2006) for a discussion of implicit male bias in corporate governance and the effects of this bias on
women’s rights.
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consumption, which was linked to increased rates of polygamy.171 Men
with more income were able to take more wives.172
3. Political Influence of Transnational Corporations
Transnational corporations exert political influence in both home
and host countries. This influence may be direct or indirect or both. In
home countries, for example, transnational corporations exert political
influence through lobbying and campaign contributions.173 When a
transnational corporation exerts political influence, it affects government
decision making in a way that encourages government action or inaction.174
Transnational corporations may also use their political influence in
their home country to influence decisions in host countries. For example,
transnational corporations incorporated in countries like the United
States pressure their home governments to pressure governments in developing countries to provide protections for the corporations’ intellectual property.175
4. Legal Influence of Transnational Corporations
Transnational corporations are often able to influence the application and enforcement of laws in the countries in which they operate. For
example, Nike’s Korean suppliers operating shoe factories in Indonesia
in the early 1990s successfully petitioned for and received an exemption
from the minimum wage.176 The companies claimed that paying mini171. See Glenn Banks, Globalization, Poverty, and Hyperdevelopment in Papua New Guinea’s
Mining Sector, 46 FOCCAL–EUR. J. A NTHROPOLOGY 128, 135 (2005).
172. See id.
173. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 881–86 (2010). This recent U.S. Supreme
Court case ensured the ability of corporations, whether domestic and foreign, to exert political influence through political speech and election contributions. Id.; cf. 2 U.S.C. § 441e(a)(1) (2006) (prohibiting foreign nationals from directly or indirectly making contributions or independent expenditures in connection with a U.S. election). However, the majority opinion does not address whether
the “[g]overnment has a compelling interest in preventing foreign individuals or associations from
influencing” the domestic political process. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911. Further, the majority
does not consider the issues in this case in the context of transnational corporations. Id. at 936 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
174. Id. at 961–63.
175. See Peter Straub, Farmers in the IP Wrench—How Patents on Gene-Modified Crops
Violate the Right to Food in Developing Countries, 29 HASTINGS INT’ L & COMP. L. REV. 187, 193
(2006). For example, U.S. companies have tried to “‘invent restrictions that do not exist within
international law and compel developing countries to accept them through U.S. trade pressures.’”
Special 301 Review Public Hearing: Hearing Before the Special 301 Subcommittee of the Office of
the U.S. Trade Representative, at 104 (2010) (from testimony given by a representative from Doctors Without Borders) available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/1726.&nbsp. Strong intellectual property rights can have detrimental effects on human health and life. Id. at 97–98 (“People in
developing countries are dying because medicines do not exist due to inadequate incentives for their
development or because they're unavailable due in part to patent barriers and high costs.”). For a
more comprehensive discussion of the intersection of trade and human rights, see BERTA
HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL & STEPHEN J. POWELL, JUST TRADE: A N EW COVENANT LINKING TRADE
AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2009).
176. Locke, supra note 22, at 10.
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mum wage would be a hardship for them.177 The local minimum wage at
the time was approximately $1 per day (2,100 rupiah) and covered only
70% of the basic needs of one individual.178 This arrangement allowed
factories producing Nike products to underpay more than 25,000 workers
without violating the letter of the law in Indonesia—the host country.179
This practice was discontinued on Nike’s request in the mid 1990s—an
example of transnational corporations’ ability to prevent human rights
abuses by their subsidiaries and suppliers, if they choose to do so.180
One important way that transnational corporations affect the legal
regimes in host countries is through investment agreements between the
state and one or more investors. Investor-state investment agreements are
agreements between host states and investors to set rules, standards, and
even determine the laws that will apply to the transaction that is the object of the contract.181 Investor-state investment agreements are problematic for the protection of human rights because they insulate “projects
from standards of protection of basic rights that apply elsewhere in a host
country; and [they] shrink[] certain remedies that victims would otherwise have.”182 Investment agreements between states and transnational
corporations are common, for example, in the extraction sector.183
Investor-state investment agreements highlight a key problem associated with transaction-based law and policymaking that takes place outside of a comprehensive legal and regulatory framework. This is signaled
by the fact that investor-state investment agreements are commonly referred to as international investment agreements.184 This nomenclature
supports claims that some transnational corporations have amassed previously unknown influence over the law and policymaking power of
these agreements. In the international investment agreement, transnational corporations become quasi-states that enter into agreements with
nation-states, and they imbue the transnational corporations with rights
and powers that allow them to encroach upon prerogatives of the public
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See id.
180. Id. at 11. Nike first denied the ability to affect the practices of companies in its supply
chain and then only did so after substantial bad press. Id. at 10–11.
181. See Sheldon Leader, Human Rights, Risks, and New Strategies for Global Investment, 9 J.
INT’ L ECON. L. 657, 703–04 (2006) (discussing the types of clauses in investment contracts and
international investment contracts in conjunction with human rights); see also Wendy N. Duong,
Partnerships with Monarchs—Two Case Studies: Case One, 25 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1171, 1265
(2004) (“In various forms, the [Stabilization] Clause restricts the host jurisdiction’s exercise of
‘permanent sovereignty’ by contractually preventing the nation-state from subsequently modifying
the governing law of the investment contract.”). Concession agreements between early transnational
corporations, formerly colonial trading companies, are the predecessors of modern international
investment contracts. See ANGHIE, supra note 52, at 233–34.
182. Leader, supra note 181, at 700.
183. See id. at 661, 696 (discussing the BTC pipeline connecting the Caspian and Mediterranean Seas and the Chad-Cameroon pipeline agreement).
184. This is a post-World War II development in international law. ANGHIE, supra note 52, at
230.
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domain.185 Taking this one step further, international investment agreements even have the potential to trump both domestic and international
law.186
These investor-state agreements are, thus, not subject to domestic
law but rather a legal system of a different kind.187 Generally, these
agreements are considered to be subject to “an international law system.”188 Thus, although the agreement is not between two nations, it is
treated as inter-national if one of the parties is a developing country and
one of the parties is a transnational corporation, but not if the country
involved is a “developed” country.189 As international agreements, arbitration of disputes is subject to international rather than national law.190
However, the shifting of transnational corporations into a quasistate status glosses over important distinctions. Transnational corporations are not states and, although the line between public and private is a
topic for debate, according them a quasi-state status contributes to the
obfuscation of problematic trends related to transaction-based law and
policy making. Transaction-based law and policy making is not subjected
to the scrutiny accorded a more public deliberative process, and the immediate interests of the parties are narrower than would be the case, for
example, if third parties with differing interests were directly involved.
States are at a greater disadvantage when entering into investment
agreements than may be apparent at first blush. Initially, it might seem
that the state has all the power since it is a sovereign nation and is the
maker and enforcer of law and policy within its territories. However, the
reason that states enter into investment agreements with investors is that
they do not have the domestic capacity, whether public or private, to
achieve the purpose of the agreement.191 Thus, they need to attract one or
more foreign investors, although they may not necessarily need to attract
a specific foreign investor. Depending on the industry, the number of
potential foreign investors may be extremely limited due to high barriers
to entry. For example, only a limited number of corporations have
equipment readily available to dedicate to drilling oil, and corporations
that want to enter this market must have sufficient capital to lay out in

185. See ANGHIE, supra note 52, at 232.
186. See Cernic, supra note 155, at 218 (analyzing the language of the 2005 Mineral Development Agreement between the National Transitional Government of Liberia and Mittal Steel Holdings AG).
187. See ANGHIE, supra note 52, at 231.
188. See id.
189. See ANGHIE, supra note 52, at 231–32 (quoting Derek Bowett, State Contracts with Aliens: Contemporary Developments on Compensation for Termination or Breach, 59 BRITISH Y.B.
INT’ L L. 49, 51 (1988)).
190. Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic, 53 I.L.R 389, 433 (Arb. Trib.
1977).
191. See generally Leader, supra note 181, at 657–694 (discussing investment contracts).
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advance to purchase the expensive equipment necessary for oil drilling.192
Investment agreements between transnational corporations and host
countries create special legal regimes of limited duration with potentially
substantial effects.193 These special legal regimes can weaken legal protections for individuals and communities in host countries.194 For example, existing human rights standards may be affected indirectly or are
limited directly by the terms of the international investment contract.195
When this happens, the host state may effectively lose its ability to enforce otherwise applicable human rights laws and standards.196
Most investor-state investment agreements include stabilization
clauses.197 A stabilization clause is “contract language which freezes the
provisions of a national system of law chosen as the law of the contract
as of the date of the contract, in order to prevent the application to the
contract of any future alterations of this system.”198 The purpose of stabilization clauses is to protect transnational corporations from unfavorable
and perhaps unfair changes in legislation or regulations after they are
locked into the contract and have sunk money into the project.199 These
stabilization clauses can, for example, prevent host states from applying
laws that come into existence after the contract is signed to the transaction that is the object of the contract.200
On their face, stabilization clauses make sense because they mitigate the risk to a transnational corporation that the other party to the contract, a sovereign state with law-making power, might change the laws
for its own benefit at any time. However, a broad stabilization clause
may also have the effect of depriving individuals and communities in the
host country of human rights protections that may become enforceable
by law after the date of an investment contract. In fact, stabilization
192. See id. at 682–83.
193. See id. at 660. Although the duration is limited, it still extends for the life of the investment project, which is often as long as seventy years. Id.
194. Id.
195. See, e.g., Cernic, supra note 155, at 220–21 (discussing the stabilization clause in the Host
Government Agreements between a consortium of oil corporations and the governments of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey regarding the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline project).
196. Leader, supra note 181, at 671.
197. Cernic, supra note 155, at 213. There are various forms of stabilization clauses. Id. at 214.
See J. Nna Emeka, Anchoring Stabilization Clauses in International Petroleum Contracts, 42 INT’L
LAW. 1317, 1318–20 (2008) (discussing the rationale for and the origin of stabilization clauses); see
also Christopher T. Curtis, The Legal Security of Economic Development Agreements, 29 HARV.
INT’ L L.J. 317, 321 (1988) (describing both stabilization and governing-law clauses in an investment
agreement).
198. Cernic, supra note 155, at 213; see also Curtis, supra note 197, at 346–47 (discussing the
nature of stabilization clauses); Sang-Jick Yoon, Comment, Critical Issues on the Foreign Investment Laws of North Korea for Foreign Investors, 15 WIS. INT’ L L.J. 325, 364–65 (1997) (describing
how stabilization clauses are “grandfathered exceptions to the new law”).
199. See Cernic, supra note 155, at 213–14.
200. See Leader, supra note 181, at 672–681 (discussing stabilization clauses in international
investment contracts).
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clauses are sometimes structured so that the entry into an international
agreement to protect human rights by a host state can make the host state
liable to the transnational corporation for profit lost due to the need to
comply with laws protecting human rights.201
B. Complexities of Multijurisdictional Regulation and Enforcement
The complex structure of transnational operations often triggers
questions of jurisdiction and impedes transnational enforcement.202 It
also creates a need for the development of comprehensive global regulation. Although there are jurisdictional challenges, there are also options
that offer promising alternatives to address existing jurisdictional hurdles.
1. Territorial Jurisdiction
Territorial jurisdiction, also known as national jurisdiction, state jurisdiction, domestic jurisdiction, and sovereignty, is the power a state has
to make laws that govern its territories and the power of its courts to exercise jurisdiction within the bounds of its territories.203 Territorial jurisdiction is one of the oldest, most fundamental, and accepted forms of
jurisdiction.204 Article 2 of the U.N. Charter, which prohibits states from
interfering in the territorial jurisdiction of other states, further protects
the territorial jurisdiction of states.205
Territorial jurisdiction makes it possible, at least theoretically, to
enact and enforce laws governing transnational corporations in the jurisdictions in which they are incorporated, operate, or have assets.206 In
part, this is because respect for state sovereignty remains a central tenet
of international human rights law.207 Thus, domestic tax, labor, business,
and antitrust laws, etc., primarily govern transnational corporations. This
is not to suggest that these laws do not sometimes have extraterritorial
201.
202.

See Leader, supra note 181, at 673–75.
Jurisdiction is the power to regulate and to enforce. See generally GARY B. BORN,
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2009); Gary B. Born, Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction in International Cases, 17 GA. J. INT’L & C OMP. L. 1, 7–25 (1987) (discussing judicial
jurisdiction in the international context).
203. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Defining the Limits: Universal Jurisdiction and National Courts,
in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 168, 171–72 (Stephen Macedo, ed., 2004); see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, The History of Universal Jurisdiction, in UNIVERSAL J URISDICTION 39, 40 (Stephen Macedo
ed., 2004); cf. Blakesley & Stigall, supra note 138, at 12 (discussing two types of jurisdiction: “rulemaking and rule-enforcing jurisdiction,” which take three forms: “prescriptive or legislative, adjudicative, and enforcement”).
204. See Bassiouni, supra note 203, at 40.
205. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
206. See JESSUP, supra note 32, at 74–76 (discussing territorial jurisdiction governing transnational corporations and the past resentments between the judicial authorities of the United States and
Canadian companies).
207. See Parrish, supra note 139, at 824 (discussing one reason for this central tenant-fears of
some scholars, theorists, and policy makers that international law has more democratic legitimacy
than domestic law). See also MALANCZUK, supra note 47, at 17–18 and Domingo, supra note 47, at
1556–65 for a discussion of the theory, doctrine, and concepts of sovereignty.
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reach, but rather that—in most cases—they are dependent on domestic
enforcement.208 However, in practice, territorial jurisdiction has proven
to be a limited tool. Transnational corporations often operate in the context of a multinational enterprise, which includes multiple entities incorporated in multiple jurisdictions working with various partners and suppliers.209
In the case of lawmaking to protect human rights, territorial jurisdiction generally determines which state and law-making bodies have
prescriptive jurisdiction, also known as legislative jurisdiction.210 In addition, as discussed above, prescriptive jurisdiction may determine the application of international law and extraterritorial application of domestic
law. For example, bilateral investment treaties are forms of international
lawmaking that govern foreign direct investment.211 However, domestic
and international laws, when they exist, are often fragmented and not
enforced. Recall the minimum wage exceptions granted by the Indonesian government to Nike suppliers.212
When corporate-related human rights abuses occur in the context of
a multinational operation, multiple states may have the right to exercise
jurisdiction. Domestic conflict of laws rules can be used to determine
which of the states that have the right to exercise jurisdiction should exercise that right in a particular case.213 Although this may seem to offer
plaintiffs multiple jurisdictions and thus multiple opportunities to pursue
redress for their claims, in practice this can work to the disadvantage of
potential plaintiffs. For example, the courts in the home country of a defendant transnational corporation may—based on their own national conflict of law rules—decide not to assert jurisdiction under the principle of
forum non conveniens. In dismissing a case for forum non conveniens,
the court finds that another forum, the host country for example, would
be a better suited—more convenient—alternative forum. At the same
time, the plaintiffs claims may be blocked for political or other reasons in
the host country. Therefore, if such a claim is dismissed, the effect in
practice is often that potential plaintiffs are left without a forum in which
to bring their claims. This is particularly true for claims dismissed in the
United States since it is one of the primary—and only—forums in which

208. See Parrish, supra note 139, at 820, 846 for a discussion of the rise of extraterritorial
domestic law and associated problems.
209. See Anderson, supra note 34, at 2.
210. See Michael D. Ramsey, International Law Limits on Investor Liability in Human Rights
Litigation, 50 HARV. INT’ L L.J. 271, 271–72 (2009) (discussing the international law implications
for foreign investors responsible for human rights abuses in developing nations in which they do
business).
211. See generally Leader, supra note 165, at 660–70.
212. Locke, supra note 22, at 10–11.
213. See JESSUP, supra note 32, at 35–39 (discussing the difference between international law
and conflicts of law and which one holds the power in a particular problem).
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is possible to bring claims for corporate-related human rights violations.214
2. Other Forms of State Jurisdiction
In addition to territorial jurisdiction, there are numerous other types
of jurisdiction in the transnational context. The least controversial form
of jurisdiction is where there is a tie between the prescribing or enforcing
state and the party who is the object of this prescription or enforcement.
The traditional bases of prescriptive jurisdiction, the power to make rules
and regulations, are territory and citizenship.215 As discussed above,
countries commonly make laws that govern their citizens and people
within their territory.216 These are also generally accepted as a matter of
customary international law.217
Forms of judicial jurisdiction, the power of a court to exercise jurisdiction, include personal jurisdiction and jurisdiction based on effects,
consent, nationality, and property.218 However, the recognized forms of
judicial jurisdiction are not uniform and vary from country to country.
For example, the United States recognizes tag or transient jurisdiction,
whereby the courts may assert personal jurisdiction even if the defendant
is passing through their jurisdiction on a wholly unrelated matter.219
French courts will generally grant jurisdiction in any case that involves a
French national on either side.220 German courts grant jurisdiction in
cases involving property located in Germany whether or not the owners
have any other ties or connections to Germany.221
3. Universal Jurisdiction
In addition to the various forms of jurisdiction recognized by different countries, there is also jurisdiction that stems from the nature of the
conduct. Universal jurisdiction allows courts to exercise jurisdiction
based on the type of conduct alone without any other connection to the
state that is exercising jurisdiction.222 Often, people think only about
214. See Anderson, supra note 34, at 4–5.
215. Paul B. Stephan, Symmetry and Selectivity: What Happens in International Law When the
World Changes, 10 CHI. J. INT’ L L. 91, 105 (2009).
216. See Ramsey, supra note 210, at 284.
217. Id.
218. See Born, supra note 202, at 1–3, 14–20.
219. Id. at 12, 36 n.147.
220. See Born, supra note 202, at 14 (citing CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art 14–15 (Fr.)).
221. See Born, supra note 202, at 14–15 (citing ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE] Sept. 12, 1950, § 23 (Ger.); Christof von Dryander, Jurisdiction in Civil and
Commercial Matters Under the German Code of Civil Procedure, 16 INT’L LAW. 671, 678 (1982)).
222. Peter Weiss, Universal Jurisdiction: Past, Present and Future, 102 AM. SOC’Y I NT’ L L.
PROC. 406, 407 (2008) (citing PRINCETON PROJECT ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, THE PRINCETON
PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 28 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2001) [hereinafter PRINCETON
PRINCIPLES] (“[U]niversal jurisdiction is criminal jurisdiction based solely on the nature of the
crime, without regard to where the crime was committed, the nationality of the alleged or convicted
perpetrator, the nationality of the victim, or any other connection to the state exercising such juris-
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criminal universal jurisdiction when they think about universal jurisdiction.
Criminal universal jurisdiction applies to conduct that falls within
one of the following categories: “piracy, slavery, genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, torture, and ‘perhaps certain acts of terrorism.’”223 Although much of the discussion about universal jurisdiction
focuses on criminal cases, universal jurisdiction can also apply in civil
contexts.224 Despite a lack of consensus as to whether human rights are
universal, it may be possible to reach a consensus that human rights
should be protected from private actors. However, universal civil jurisdiction for corporate-related human rights abuses is not yet an established principle of law.
C. Human Rights and Core Values in Crisis
Alone, the power and influence of transnational corporations may
not be sufficient to justify developing alternative regulatory and enforcement options. Even coupled with the challenges of multijurisdictional regulation and enforcement, it may be difficult to convince many
scholars and policy makers that additional administrative and regulatory
mechanisms are necessary to restrain and harness the power and influence of transnational corporations. However, the nature of human rights
as core values and the history of corporate-related human rights abuses
lend support to arguments for the need to regulate transnational corporations at a global level.225
In western cultures, the idea of human rights as an individual’s
claim that can be asserted against society (whether or not there is a legal
right) has its roots in the medieval era.226 The western origins of civil and
political rights as protections against government have their roots in the
Renaissance and the Reformation.227 However, protection of human

diction.”)). Universal jurisdiction is one of the most controversial forms of jurisdiction. See Henry J.
Steiner, Three Cheers for Universal Jurisdiction—or Is It Only Two?, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L.
199, 224–26 (2004) (describing reaction from other states to the potential exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction by Belgian courts).
223. Anthony J. Colangelo, The Legal Limits of Universal Jurisdiction, 47 VA. J. INT’ L L. 149,
151 (2006) (citing United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991)); see also
PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 222, at 29; Anthony J. Colangelo, The New Universal Jurisdiction: In Absentia Signaling Over Clearly Defined Crimes, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 537, 578–603 (2005).
224. See Weiss, supra note 222, at 407.
225. See Paul R. Dubinsky, Human Rights Law Meets Private Law Harmonization: The Coming Conflict, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 211, 304 (2005) (“From a compliance point of view, what is most
distinctive about human rights law is that it requires extraordinarily high compliance levels.”).
226. Rubin, supra note 14, at 10 (discussing the origins of the doctrine of natural rights). For a
justification for a rights approach, see Barbara Stark, Women’s Rights, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF H UMAN
RIGHTS 341–44 (David P. Forsythe, ed., 2009) (arguing that the benefits of a rights approach include
the moral weight carried by rights rhetoric, the provision of a theoretical framework, a wellestablished infrastructure, and the power and flexibility of rights as a tool).
227. Id. at 35–37 (discussing the origins of civil and political rights).
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rights through law emerged out of religious and public policy considerations.228
Historically, rules and laws protecting human dignity and human
rights were often articulated in response to extreme power and influence
combined with encroachments upon those rights and dignity. Crisis is
often the catalyst that prompts change. There are many examples of these
times of crisis and change, including in the history of the Catholic
Church, the American Revolution, and the post-World War II creation of
the international human rights regime.229
Religious institutions have espoused human rights—albeit under
another name—as core values for centuries. The predecessor of early
western human rights theory, natural rights theory, emerged at a time
when the Catholic Church exercised enormous power.230 This time of
crisis is exemplified by the tension between the growth of the Franciscan
Order after its recognition by Pope Innocent III in 1209 and the Inquisition’s increasing violence, including torture.231 Under the doctrine of
natural rights, there are certain “claims that can be asserted by all human
beings.”232 These ideas are captured in the writings of William von Ockham, author of the first Western theory of natural rights and a follower of
the Franciscan philosophies.233 They have also been delineated in the
Catholic social doctrine.234
Human rights have been articulated as core values as part of the
creation of nations. In the eighteenth century, the American Declaration
of Independence, one of the most famous articulations of individual
rights as a political idea, was signed in the context of economic oppression by the British government of its American colonies.235 This crisis is
exemplified by oppression in the form of, for example, the Sugar, Stamp,
and Townshend Acts. These acts imposed taxes and import restrictions
228.
229.

Id. at 168.
See generally THOMAS D. WILLIAMS, WHO IS MY NEIGHBOR?: PERSONALISM AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF H UMAN RIGHTS 31–52 (2005), for a historical perspective of the Church’s attitudes concerning human rights.
230. See Rubin, supra note 14, at 10.
231. See id. at 12; Inquisition, CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/
08026a.htm#IIA (last visited Oct. 31, 2010).
232. Rubin, supra note 14, at 10.
233. Id. at 13–14; see id. at 14–17 (discussing Ockham’s writings).
234. See generally JAY P. CORRIN, CATHOLIC I NTELLECTUALS AND THE CHALLENGE OF
DEMOCRACY 41–81 (2002) (describing the development of Catholic social action and the principles
of Rerum Novarum (On Capital and Labor)); RICHARD W. ROUSSEAU, H UMAN DIGNITY AND THE
COMMON GOOD: THE GREAT PAPAL SOCIAL ENCYCLICALS FROM LEO XIII TO J OHN PAUL II (2002)
(describing the eight major papal encyclicals on the Church’s social teaching); JOHAN D. VAN DER
VYVER, LEUVEN LECTURES ON RELIGIOUS I NSTITUTIONS, RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES AND RIGHTS
91–116 (2004) (discussing economic and social human rights and Pope Leo XIII and the Rerum
Novarum, the “Magna Carta of Catholic social teaching”). See generally MODERN CATHOLIC
SOCIAL TEACHING 72–174 (Kenneth R. Himes ed., 2005) for an extensive discussion of the economic, legal, political, cultural, and social context leading to the creation of the Catholic social
doctrine.
235. See HENKIN, supra note 49, at 1.
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upon colonists who did not have a voice in the government and were
backed by the threat of and acts of violence. The Declaration of Independence posits that all human beings, or at least all men, possess “certain unalienable Rights,” including “Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”236
The international community has championed human rights as core
values. Modern international human rights documents delineating the
rights of individuals and communities against abuses of state power
flourished in the wake of the Nazi-driven horrors of the last century.237
This time of crisis is exemplified by the genocide committed by the
German National Socialist government against Jewish, black, Sinti and
Roma, and other peoples as well as political dissidents. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights was signed in the wake of these
atrocities.238
Private economic actors and international organizations have endorsed human rights as core values. The crisis of corporate-related human rights abuses has been detailed above and there is increasingly
broad recognition that transnational corporations should be subject to
human rights law.239 Many corporations are reconsidering their role in
respecting human rights.240 Voluntary codes of conduct have proliferated.241 At the international level, the U.N. Global Compact promotes
core human rights and other principles in the context of global business
activities.242 However, to effectively regulate transnational corporations,
regulations and regulatory control must be comprehensive and enforceable.243 Part III looks towards the development of a comprehensive
global legal framework for regulating transnational corporations.

236. THE D ECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
237. HENKIN, supra note 49, at 1; see MALANCZUK, supra note 47, at 209. However, some
scholars argue that the Nazi’s human rights abuses are less central to the development of the international human rights regime than is often ascribed to them. See Mazower, supra note 51, at 381 (“As
for Nazi evil, we know now that the Holocaust as such was much less central to perceptions of what
the war had been about in 1945 than it is today.”).
238. HENKIN, supra note 49, at 1.
239. See Deva, supra note 2, at 1 (“The international community is realizing that in order to
achieve fuller and wider realization of human rights, the umbrella of human rights obligations and
their enforcement should cover MNCs.”); see also Ratner, supra note 82, at 446–47 (providing
examples of human rights violations in different regions and the response toward transnational
corporations operating there).
240. See George, supra note 150, at 474–75.
241. George, supra note 150, at 475; Ratner, supra note 82, at 448. See generally Lisa M.
Fairfax, Easier Said than Done? A Corporate Law Theory for Actualizing Social Responsibility
Rhetoric, 59 FLA. L. R EV. 771, 771–826 (2007), for a discussion of the behavioral significance of
corporate rhetoric.
242. See JOSEPH, supra note 1, at 7–8; Anderson, supra note 34, at 17; George, supra note 150,
at 475.
243. BLUMBERG, supra note 136, at 200–01 (“The reality of the matter is that effective regulation of corporate groups or their activities inevitably requires control of all the components participating in the enterprise. . . . [I]t is essential that the legal structure match the economic structure of
the enterprise subject to the regulatory system.”); see also Edward L. Rubin, Passing Through the
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III. GLOBAL REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS
This Part III sets out a proposal for the global regulation of transnational corporations. This proposal has three parts that address existing
institutional, legislative, and enforcement weaknesses in current regulation of transnational corporations. Specifically, it proposes the creation
of a global institution, development of uniform model laws, and implementation of universal enforcement mechanisms for corporate-related
human rights abuses.
A global regulatory scheme has the potential to be more successful
than a political one. In recent years, regulatory cooperation has successfully developed international rules.244 In part, this is explained by economic assumptions that regulations are needed in the case of market failure; for example, when sovereign national governments cannot regulate
global actors or where market failures are combined with government
failures.245 As discussed in Parts I and II, in the context of corporaterelated human rights abuses, regulation by national governments is inadequate for a number of reasons—including the power and influence of
transnational corporations.
To be successful, a regulatory system for transnational corporations
should meet several criteria. Regulation should be truly global so that
transnational corporations cannot avoid responsibility and accountability
by jurisdiction hopping or forum shopping. Global regulations and laws
also have the potential to reduce the incentives for states to allow standards that are so low that they encourage human rights abuses in order to
encourage foreign direct investment. If laws and regulations are global
and set a globally adhered to minimum standard, this would not eliminate
competition between states but it could increase the enactment and enforcement of human rights laws.
Global regulation should include rulemaking, adjudicatory, and enforcement components.246 Rulemaking would define appropriate conduct
for transnational corporations and protections for potential victims of
corporate-related human rights abuses. Providing for global adjudication
options would increase access for potential plaintiffs to bring a claim for
Door: Social Movement Literature and Legal Scholarship, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 83 (2001) (“The
recognition of human rights may be won by the activism of social movements, but this victory must
be secured by the development of legal concepts that can be understood and used by public decision
makers.”); Aneel Karani, The Case Against Corporate Social Responsibility, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23,
2010 (arguing that voluntary measures fail when they conflict with financial goals).
244. David Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of International
Financial Regulatory Organizations, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 281, 282 (1998).
245. John-ren Chen, Global Market, National Sovereignty and International Institutions, in
THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL I NSTITUTIONS IN GLOBALISATION: THE CHALLENGES OF REFORM 1,
1 (John-ren Chen ed., 2003).
246. See generally David Zaring, Rulemaking and Adjudication in International Law, 46
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 563, 563–611 (2008), for a discussion of rulemaking, adjudication, and
the increasing importance administrative institutions at the global level.
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harms before an adjudicatory body. Global enforcement would create an
avenue by which successful plaintiffs could obtain remedies anywhere in
the world. Ideally, a global regulatory system should not only create disincentives for harmful behavior, but should also encourage beneficial
behavior. Further, it should be informed by other prior and current efforts
to create global and transnational regulatory bodies and rules.247 It should
also be compatible with existing structures like the U.N. Framework
wherever possible.
Creating a global regulatory framework and component mechanisms will not happen overnight. This is a multi-stage, multi-component
proposal comprised of short-term, medium-term, and long-term elements. In the short term, developing a global institution is a matter of the
first order. As the proposed site for the drafting of uniform model laws, a
global institution is a pre-requisite for the medium-term element of creating a body of uniform model legislation. In the medium term, this proposal foresees the drafting of model uniform laws that can be adopted in
toto or with some variations by the nations of the world.248 In the long
term, this proposal envisions adjudication of claims in domestic courts or
the use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms or both and enforcement of remedies for successful plaintiffs.

247. Earlier attempts include the failed UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights and the comparatively
successful OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, SubComm’n on the Promotion and Prot. Of Human Rights, Rep. on its 55th Sess., U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (August 26, 2003) [hereinafter U.N. Norms]. See generally Larry Catá
Backer, Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law: The United Nations’ Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as a Harbinger of Corporate Social Responsibility in
International Law, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 287, 292–93 (2006) (discussing the U.N. Norms
as evidence of an increasing trend toward mandatory Corporate Social Responsibility); Surya Deva,
UN’s Human Rights Norms for Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises: An
Imperfect Step in the Right Direction?, 10 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 493 (2004) (discussing the
strengths and weaknesses of the U.N. Norms); David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to
Human Rights, 97 AM. J. INT’ L L. 901, 901–08 (2003) (discussing the background and drafting
history of the U.N. Norms). Most prior attempts to extend human rights law to transnational corporations were usually unsuccessful. Other attempts include, for example, the 1983 Draft United Nations
Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, the 1958 Abs Shawcross Proposed Convention to
Protect Foreign Investment, and the 1957 Draft International Convention for the Mutual Protection
of Private Property Rights, U.N. Comm’n on Transnat’l Corps., Draft U.N. Code of Conduct on
Transnat’l Corps., E/1983/17/Rev.1 (1983). Arguably, one main reason these attempts failed is that
they were trying to work within the international system, which suffers from an aggregated lack of
incentives for states to enforce human rights laws as discussed above. As long as states have a disincentive to reform, such attempts face an uphill battle that almost dooms them to failure from the
start.
248. Bernardo M. Cremades & Steven L. Plehn, The New Lex Mercatoria and the Harmonization of the Laws of International Commercial Transactions, 2 B.U. INT’ L L.J. 317, 323 (1984) (“The
model law process represents a compromise between the treaty process and purely unilateral action
by nations.”). However, variations to model laws should not be for the purpose of limiting their
scope as is often the case with the use of reservations in the adoption of international treaties but
rather, for example, for the purpose of integrating the model laws and the existing national legal
system.

File: Anderson_FinalProof_12711.doc

218

Created on: 1/27/11 6:12 PM

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Last Printed: 1/28/11 7:16 AM

[Vol. 88:1

This proposal differs from earlier attempts in important ways. It is
not set within the international political system, which suffers from an
aggregated lack of incentives for states to enforce human rights laws as
discussed above. Instead, it is structured as a global regulatory proposal.
This will avoid some of the reasons that states have a disincentive to
reform and sidestep the uphill battle that has doomed some prior efforts.
This proposal envisions a global institution that, among other things,
should be structured in a way to allow it to explicitly address the needs of
developing countries from a developing country perspective, which is not
the case for most international institutions.249 This proposal draws on
theories of Global Corporate Citizenship, which are a recent development of the past decade. However, Global Corporate Citizenship is currently voluntary and this Article is proposing mandatory regulations.250 It
also proposes universal civil jurisdiction for corporate-related human
rights abuses, which extends beyond current understandings of universal
civil jurisdiction.251
A. Global Law Commission
The first component of this proposal is a global institution, specifically, a Global Law Commission. This is an initial proposal that will be
expanded and refined in a future article entitled Global Law Commission: Institutionalizing Global Human Rights Regulation of Transnational Corporations (working title). This Section sets out some of the
options and challenges for a Global Law Commission.
A Global Law Commission would facilitate effective and simultaneous regulation of transnational corporations in multiple jurisdictions.252
One goal of the Global Law Commission would be to provide countries
with well-conceived, well-drafted legislation that brings clarity and stability to this critical area of the law. The Global Law Commission could
contribute to protecting human rights and providing access to remedies
for corporate-related human rights abuses. Among other things, the
Global Law Commission should explicitly address the needs of developing countries. This Subsection sets out in broad brushstrokes basic contours of a proposal, including formation, membership, level of institutionalization, funding, selection of representatives, transparency of deci-

249. Kunibert Raffer, Some Proposals to Adapt International Institutions to Developmental
Needs, in THE ROLE OF I NTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN GLOBALISATION: THE CHALLENGES OF
REFORM 81, 81 (John-ren Chen ed., 2003) (“Most international institutions were not drafted for the
specific needs of so-called ‘developing countries’ . . . .”).
250. Anderson, supra note 34, at 29.
251. See generally Donald Francis Donovan & Anthea Roberts, The Emerging Recognition of
Universal Civil Jurisdiction, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 142 (2006) (discussing universal civil jurisdiction).
252. See Mark Tushnet, Keeping Your Eye on the Ball: The Significance of the Revival of
Constitutional Federalism, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1065, 1067 (1997) (“It seems obvious that only
transnational political institutions are likely to be in a position to control transnational corporations.”).
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sion-making, and the role of the Global Law Commission as an advocate.253
1. Formation
The Global Law Commission should be formed in a manner that allows it to act independently of the international legal system while at the
same time recognizing the interdependent nature of all legal systems. For
example, like international financial regulatory organizations, the Global
Law Commission could be informally constituted.254 It should not be
created through international treaties, as it is not intended to be a creature
of international law.255
Instead, the constituting documents of the Global Law Commission
could be a constitution (or similar document) and bylaws. This is a
model that has been employed in the creation of successful international
financial institutions including the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision and the International Organization of Securities Commissions.256
Domestically, it is also the constituting structure of the U.S. National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (“U.S. Uniform
Law Commission”).257 This structure would facilitate the operation of the
Global Law Commission as a global administrative and regulatory institution rather than a political institution. It would also allow the bylaws to
be “broad and flexible.”258
2. Membership
The membership of the Global Law Commission should be composed of commissioners who represent the people of the world. In the
Global Law Commission, states would not be members.259 This Subsec253. David Zaring, Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in International Administration, 5 CHI.
J. INT’L L. 547, 569–71 (2005) (developing a model of regulatory cooperation on which these categories are based). Instead of Zaring’s term “proselytizer,” this Article uses the term “advocate.”
254. See id. at 569–71 (discussing a model of regulatory cooperation based on common features of international law of the Basle Committee, the International Organization of Securities
Commissions, and their successors).
255. See id.
256. See Zaring, supra note 244, at 282. International financial regulatory cooperation is one
area in which institutions and rules have been successfully developed. Id. at 282; see also David
Zaring, Three Challenges for Regulatory Networks, 43 INT’L LAW. 211, 211–17 (2009) (discussing
the evolution and effectiveness of regulatory networks); Zaring, supra note 253, at 549 (discussing
the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision and the International Organization of Securities
Commissions).
257. The Uniform Law Commission has existed in the United States for over 100 years. Unif.
Law Comm’n., NCCUSL H OME, at http://www.nccusl.org/Update/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2010). The
Uniform Law Commission “provides states with non-partisan, well-conceived and well-drafted
legislation that brings clarity and stability to critical areas of the law.” Id. Historically, the Uniform
Law Commission has made numerous contributions including resolving conflict-of-law issues,
facilitating commerce, and advancing reciprocity and remedies between states. Chato Hazelbaker,
National Legislation, One State at a Time, 66-DEC BENCH & B. MINN. 22, 23 (2009).
258. Zaring, supra note 253, at 570 (stating that “many treaties that create traditional international organizations” are “specific, detailed, and constraining”).
259. See id. at 569.
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tion discusses initial proposals for the selection of members of the Global
Law Commission. Other issues that will need to be addressed include
determining criteria for membership and the size of the Global Law
Commission, specifically the minimum and maximum number of members.
One option is to allow only national governments to appoint or
nominate commissioners in a process that is similar to that used for the
U.S. Uniform Law Commission or the International Law Commission.260
A downside to this membership structure is individual countries’ ability
to interfere in the process by simply refusing to appoint or nominate
commissioners. However, this could be remedied by giving the Global
Law Commission the power to request the body that regulates the legal
profession in that country to make appointments or nominations—
assuming that the body regulating the legal profession is able to act independently. More significantly, it is inherently inconsistent and problematic to base membership selection on the international legal system since
the global law system is intended to function in parallel with but not be
dependent on the international legal system. If national governments
appoint or nominate the commissioners, then they are arguably representatives of countries even if the Global Law Commission is structured to
ensure them as much independence as possible.
Instead, one alternative for membership selection is proportional
representation. The Global Law Commission would have a fixed or
flexible—within a certain range—number of members. The commissioners could be allocated proportionally, for example, by continent according to population or other criteria and the allocation could be reviewed
and revised at set intervals. This would reflect the nature of the Global
Law Commission as a global institution rather than an international institution.
Commissioners could be nominated by national governments,
NGOs, bodies that regulate the legal profession, as well other institutional actors. To be elected, nominees would need to meet the criteria set
for membership in the Global Law Commission. Institutions that are
given the right to nominate could also constitute the body that elects the
commissioners from those nominated based on a one-entity, one-vote
principle. One challenge associated with this option is determining which
institutions and groups would have the right to make nominations. A
benefit of this mode of selection would be to expand the pool of nominators and, thus, the pool of potential nominees. It would also serve to de260. UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION CONST. art. II, available at http://www.nccusl.org/Update/
DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=3&tabid=18; UNITED N ATIONS, THE WORK OF THE I NTERNATIONAL
LAW COMMISSION, 8–17 (Vol. I, 2007); JEFFREY S. MORTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
COMMISSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS 10-12 (2000); and SIR IAN SINCLAIR, THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW COMMISSION 13-21 (1987).
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crease the level of control by national governments but recognize the
importance of national governments and the interconnection and interdependency of all legal orders of the world.
Another issue that will need to be addressed is the possibility of
creating multiple forms of membership, such as ex officio membership in
addition to elected membership, and the advantages and disadvantages of
these alternative forms. Having different forms of membership would
make it possible to select commissioners in more than one way. For example, some percentage of the commissioners could be nominated and
elected among national governments, some could be nominated and
elected by NGOs and other institutional actors, and some could be nominated and elected by bodies that regulate the legal profession. Allocating
certain percentages of commissioners to certain interest groups such as
national governments would help garner support from those groups for
the Global Law Commission’s work. However, this might expose the
Global Law Commission’s work to becoming more political than regulatory.
3. Institutionalization
The Global Law Commission should meet at regular intervals, for
example annually, to draft model uniform laws in key human rights areas
affected by transnational corporations. In addition, it is likely that the
Global Law Commission would need to continue work on ongoing projects in committees. Committees could be determined based on substantive areas or type of tasks. Substantive committees offer an advantage
because they allow the clustering of substantive expertise. However, task
oriented committees may present a better option because the make-up of
the committee would bring together people with varying substantive expertise who, together, have the skills and knowledge to achieve the
committee’s assigned tasks.
The Global Law Commission should have a permanent presence.
Either a small permanent presence or a more substantial permanent presence would have their benefits. A small permanent presence would keep
costs, and thus the need for funding, low.261 A more substantial permanent presence would cost more but would allow the Global Law Commission to operate year-round. However, an increased need for funds
amplifies questions about sources of funding and the level of influence of
governments and intuitions providing those funds.
4. Funding
Funding will be a significant factor in the size and success of the
Global Law Commission’s administrative apparatus. The level of fund261. Zaring, supra note 253, at 571 (stating that international financial regulatory organizations
“have little permanent presence” and “[t]heir annual budgets are minute”).
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ing required will depend in large part on whether the Global Law Commission has a large or small permanent presence. The larger the permanent presence, the greater the need will be for funding.262 However, funding will be a less significant factor if the commissioners work on a volunteer basis and are not compensated. Nonetheless, some minimal funding would be necessary, even for volunteer commissioners, to defray
expenses.
Contributions from interested parties such as national governments
are one likely source of funding for the Global Law Commission. States
would need to have an incentive to contribute to the Global Law Commission. One incentive for states would be that they could receive legal
expertise in the form of drafting of uniform laws worth millions of dollars. Many individual states could not otherwise afford the cost of this
type of legal expertise.263
5. Transparency
Ensuring a high level of transparency can help the Global Law
Commission gain and maintain legitimacy. One question is whether
meetings of the commission should be open to the public.264 Open meetings may increase accessibility for those who have the time and financial
resources to attend. However, on a global scale, open meetings may also
create and legitimize preferential access for more influential actors and
exclude interested parties with fewer resources. In addition, open meetings may stifle open and frank discussion.
Instead, the Global Law Commission should have a forum for publicizing drafts and accepting comments from interested parties.265 The
Global Law Commission should also commit to making a wide range of
relevant documents available online.266 Ensuring an opportunity for public comment on drafts via the Internet will increase transparency—
assuming that the opportunity to comment is widely publicized in a manner that reaches interested parties.

262. See id. This discussion is intended only to raise the complex and fundamental issue of
state support, in particular financial support. The question of securing state support will be analyzed
in greater detail in a future article entitled Global Law Commission: Institutionalizing Global Human
Rights Regulation of Transnational Corporations (working title).
263. Financial Support, NCCUSL, http://www.nccusl.org/Update/DesktopDefault.aspx?
tabindex=0&tabid=11 (last visited on Oct. 31, 2010) (drawing from the Uniform Law Commission
model).
264. This draws from the U.S. Uniform Law Commission model. UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION.
art. XLI. In contrast, international financial regulatory organization meetings are generally not open
to the public. Zaring, supra note 253, at 571 (“[International financial regulatory organizations]
generally operate through closed meetings . . . .”).
265. See Zaring, supra note 253, at 571 (“[T]he Basle Committee and [International Organization of Securities Commissions] . . . make an effort to invite comment from interested parties on
their most significant regulatory efforts.”).
266. Id. at 571–72 (discussing a practice that has become common among international financial regulatory organizations).
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6. Advocacy
Model laws drafted by the Global Law Commission can contribute
to the development of both soft and hard law. Like other documents written by international organizations and NGOs, model laws drafted by the
Global Law Commission may influence soft-law norms and contribute to
the enactment of hard law. Model laws drafted by the Global Law Commission for domestic implementation would need to be passed by national governments to be enforceable in domestic courts. This could
change if, at a later stage, a global court is established or countries sign
onto conventions to enforce alternative dispute resolution or universal
civil jurisdiction for claims related to corporate-related human rights
violations.
Encouraging national governments to implement draft laws in their
jurisdiction will be an important role for the Global Law Commission.267
Like international financial regulatory organizations, the Global Law
Commission would need to work actively to disseminate best practices.
In addition, the Global Law Commission could advocate for and play a
role in drafting conventions to enforce forms of alternative dispute resolution or universal civil jurisdiction as well as the creation of a global
court.
Implementing the Global Law Commission will not be simple or
without challenges. One of the key challenges is how to get countries on
board with the Global Law Commission and enact the model laws developed by the Global Law Commission. However, there are examples that
can provide insights into avenues that may lead to success. For example,
forty-two countries adhere—more or less—to the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises.268 An examination of the strengths and weaknesses of that process can provide valuable insights. Further, an analysis
of why the United States became a member of the United Nations but not
the League of Nations, and why the United States signed onto the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade but not the International Trade Organization offers an opportunity to identify factors that may encourage
countries like the United States to support—or at least accept—the
Global Law Commission.
B. Global Laws and Regulations
The second component of this proposal is the development of global
laws and regulations by the Global Law Commission informed by a the267. Id. at 572 (discussing the proselytizing roles played by international financial regulatory
organizations).
268. Directorate for Fin. & Enter. Affairs, The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Frequently Asked Questions, ORG. FOR ECON. CO- OPERATION & DEV.,
http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,3343,en_2649_34889_2349370_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited
on Oct. 31, 2010).
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ory of Law and Global Corporate Citizenship.269 This is an initial proposal that will be expanded and refined in a future article entitled A Legal Theory of Global Corporate Citizenship: Reimagining Global Regulation of Transnational Corporations (working title). Existing legal theory does not provide a viable framework in which to adequately address
the effects of corporate activities on human rights. In addition to the
weaknesses in international human rights law discussed above, theories
of corporate law and foreign direct investment law are also inadequate to
comprehensively theorize and regulate the intersection of transnational
economic activity and human rights.270 Because there is not an adequate
theoretical framework to address issues raised by the effects of transnational corporations on individuals’ and communities’ enjoyment of their
human rights, corporate-related human rights abuses remain on the periphery of law and theory.
In corporate law and theory in the United States, corporations are
generally depicted as economic entities that should be regulated by the
market through economic incentives and mechanisms.271 This position is
solidly established at the heart of American corporate legal theory.272
However, there is a minority in the United States that argues that corporations are economic and social entities.273 This minority often identifies
with the Corporate Social Responsibility movement.274 This line of argument does not limit the means of controlling corporations to economic
incentives. Nonetheless, it remains on the periphery of U.S. corporate
legal theory and is not likely to become a central tenet of U.S. corporate
law and theory anytime in the near future.
Lacking traction in corporate law and theory, we might logically
turn to the web of domestic laws, bilateral investment treaties, and other
international law that govern foreign direct investment. However, foreign
269. Although the development of model global laws does not reduce the need for plaintiffs to
have the financial capacity to bring suits, adherence to human rights-related laws and norms by
transnational corporations can reduce the need for plaintiffs to bring suits by reducing the occurrence
of corporate-related human rights abuses. See Backer, supra note 247, at 351–54.
270. Similar arguments can be made for other areas of law and theory, for example, law and
development.
271. Backer, supra note 247, at 296–98 (“The state was to define the parameters within which
this flexible framework could be effected and policed, but otherwise the market was to provide the
mechanism for regulating corporate activity.”).
272. Id. at 296–99 (tracing this position back to the acceptance of arguments made by Adolph
Berle in a debate with E. Merrick Dodd in the 1930s); see also A. A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as
Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (1931) (discussing the impact of corporate actions
taken serve to benefit its shareholders); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom are Corporate Managers
Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1145–47 (1932) (discussing the purpose and function of the
corporate structure).
273. See Cynthia A. Williams, Corporations Theory and Corporate Governance Law: Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic Globalization, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705, 716
(2002).
274. The exact scope and contours of Corporate Social Responsibility are disputed within the
U.S. legal discourse. See id. at 711–20 (categorizing positions taken on CSR in the U.S. legal discourse).
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direct investment is generally thought of as a primarily economic activity
and the laws governing such activities reflect those assumptions.275
Purely domestic laws often fall prey to lax enforcement in the face of
government goals to bring in funds and promote economic development
through foreign investment.276 Bilateral and other international agreements between countries tend to focus on protecting their own natural
and legal citizens’ foreign investments from expropriation and naturalization without appropriate compensation.277 It is unlikely that the protection of the rights and interests of non-citizens will be given a higher priority than the protection of a state’s own citizens and economic interests
in foreign direct investment law. Thus, the regulation of the negative
environmental and human rights effects of corporations is likely to remain on the periphery of foreign direct investment law and theory.
However, theoretical advancements have been made in other disciplines. Global Corporate Citizenship is a body of theoretical work initially developed in the management and business literature in the late
1990s that could provide a strong basis for developing global laws to
regulate transnational corporations.278 Over the past decade, a robust
Global Corporate Citizenship literature has developed in the business and
management fields.279 This literature argues for voluntary initiatives by
transnational corporations.280 The rationale for transnational corporations
275. See Dr. Elfraim Chalamish, The Future of Bilateral Investment Treaties: A De Facto
Multilateral Agreement?, 34 BROOK. J. INT’ L L. 303, 328 (2009).
276. This problem should be addressed in part by universal civil jurisdiction, which would
allow plaintiffs to bring cases in courts of countries with a record of more consistent enforcement.
See Donovan & Roberts, supra note 251, 142–46 (“[U]niversal jurisdiction provides a mechanism
for enhancing accountability.”).
277. See, e.g., Jason Webb Yackee, Bilateral Investment Treaties, Credible Commitment, and
the Rule of (International) Law: Do BITs Promote Foreign Direct Investment?, 42 LAW & SOC’ Y
REV. 805, 808 (2008) (“Most BITs contain a common core of substantive promises to investors,
including rights to some combination of ‘most-favored nation,’ national, ‘non-discriminatory,’ or
‘fair and equitable’ ‘treatment’; rights to ‘full protection and security’; rights to ‘prompt, adequate,
and effective’ compensation in the event of expropriation or of government measures ‘tantamount to
expropriation’; and the right to transfer investment assets or proceeds out of the host state in convertible currency.”).
278. See LOGAN, ROY & RUGELBRUGGE, supra note 96, at 13, 16.
279. See, e.g., LOGAN, ROY & RUGELBRUGGE, supra note 96, at 6–7; James E. Post & Shawn
L. Berman, Global Corporate Citizenship in a Dot.com World: The Role of Organisational Identity,
in PERSPECTIVES ON CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP 66, 66–67 (Jörg Andriof & Malcolm McIntosh eds.,
2001); Jeanne M. Logsdon & Donna J. Wood, Business Citizenship: From Domestic to Global Level
of Analysis, 12 BUS. ETHICS Q., no. 2, 2002, at 155; James E. Post, Global Corporate Citizenship:
Principles to Live and Work By, 12 BUS. ETHICS Q., no. 2, 2002, at 143, 148–49 [hereinafter Principles to Live and Work By]; James E. Post, Moving from Geographic to Virtual Communities: Global
Corporate Citizenship in a Dot.com World, 105 BUS. & SOC. REV. 27, 27–29 (2000); Klaus Schwab,
Global Corporate Citizenship: Working With Governments and Civil Society, 87 FOREIGN AFF. 107,
107–108 (2008); Sandra Waddock & Neil Smith, Relationships: The Real Challenge of Global
Corporate Citizenship, 105 BUS. & SOC. REV. 47, 47–49 (2000); Grahame Thompson, Tracking
Global Citizenship: Some Reflections on ‘Lovesick’ Companies 1–2 (Inst. for Int’l Integration Studies, Discussion Paper No. 192, 2006), available at https://www.tcd.ie/iiis/documents/
discussion/pdfs/iiisdp192.pdf.
280. See generally Schwab, supra note 269, at 107–18 (discussing participation and benefits in
engaging in global corporate citizenship and corporate social responsibility).
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to undertake these initiatives is that they have economic benefits for the
corporations in addition to being beneficial for society.281
However, one danger of relying on voluntary measures is that they
themselves often rely on the flawed assumptions of a purely economic
analysis of business management. Purely economic analyses of business
choices are susceptible to over-reliance on quantitative tools.282 Overreliance on quantitative tools is often accompanied by a disregard for moral
and cultural factors, which artificially limits our understanding of issues
and the range of corresponding regulatory options.283 Instead, some
scholars argue for a “deeply human-centered conception of business”
that “depend[s] on the exercise of virtue, respect for dignity, and a shared
sense of the common good.”284 Voluntary measures are also problematic
because the self-interests of transnational corporations may not always
align with societal interests. In such situations, voluntary measures are
often—at most—a minimal but not dispositive incentive.
Global Corporate Citizenship literature builds on corporate citizenship literature by expanding it to the global sphere. Global Corporate
Citizenship initiatives have garnered the attention and support of transnational corporations.285 At the international level, the Global Compact, a
United Nations initiative, has promoted a set of values that are aligned
with theories of Global Corporate Citizenship.286 However, the voluntary
nature of these initiatives exposes them to the same weaknesses as other
voluntary measures—transnational corporations can pick and choose
among measures. From a business perspective, this is beneficial because
it allows managers and directors to choose measures that suit their context and that fit their business modes.287 From a human rights perspective, this is a disadvantage because voluntary norms and standards do not
require transnational corporations to consider, recognize, or adhere to
any domestic or international norms or standards such as international

281. See Principles to Live and Work By, supra note 279, 143–44, 148.
282. Kevin T. Jackson, The Scandal Beneath the Financial Crisis: Getting a View from a
Moral-Cultural Mental Model, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’ Y 735, 746–47 (2010) (stating that the
trend of increasing mathematization of science “is not as suitable for examining a broad range of
phenomena—such as institutions, values, culture, and traditions—that clearly have an enormous
bearing on economic life.”).
283. Id. at 747 (quoting WILHELM RÖPKE, A HUMANE ECONOMY: THE SOCIAL FRAMEWORK
OF THE FREE MARKET 247 (Elizabeth Henderson trans., 1960) (lamenting the decline of morality in
economics)).
284. Id. at 752–53 (“[The] human-centered conception of business is supported by a long
tradition of thought common to ancient cultures.”) (citing SAMUEL GREGG, THE COMMERCIAL
SOCIETY: FOUNDATIONS AND CHALLENGES IN A GLOBAL AGE 9 (2007)).
285. Anderson, supra note 34, at 22–23.
286. The Ten Principles, U NITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, http://www.unglobalcompact.
org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html (last visited on Oct. 31, 2010).
287. Cf. Jackson, supra note 282, at 758 (stating that reactionary corporate social responsibility
measures may be disadvantageous when companies are “placed under strict accountability, compliance, and enforcement demands in utter disregard of the type and character of the business at hand
the conditions under which it might prosper”).
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human rights law.288 Further, such voluntary measures are often reactionary and piecemeal rather than proactive and comprehensive.289
Although Global Corporate Citizenship is well developed in the
management and business literature, it is not yet firmly established in
legal scholarship.290 In the business and management context, it is an
evolving voluntary practice. Businesses are supposed to be good corporate citizens because it makes business sense—there are economic benefits. In the legal context, mandatory Global Corporate Citizenship is
more appropriate when core values such as human rights are at issue.
Mandatory laws and regulations are better suited to ensuring compliance
and recourse to enforcement than voluntary ones. Thus, it is important to
develop mandatory regulations in addition to voluntary initiatives.
There are four principles of Corporate Citizenship: Minimize Harm;
Maximize Benefit; Accountability and Responsiveness to Key
Stakeholders; and Strong Financial Return.291 The first principle of Corporate Citizenship is Minimize Harm, which is defined as:
Work[ing] to minimize the negative consequences of business activities and decisions on stakeholders, including employees, customers,
communities, ecosystems, shareholders and suppliers. Examples include operating ethically, supporting efforts to stop corruption,
championing human rights, preventing environmental harm, enforcing good conduct from suppliers, treating employees responsibly, ensuring the safety of employees, ensuring that marketing statements
292
are accurate, and delivering safe, high-quality products.

The second principle of Corporate Citizenship is Maximize Benefit,
defined as:
“Contribut[ing] to societal and economic well-being by investing resources in activities that benefit shareholders as well as broader
stakeholders.” Examples include participating voluntarily to help address social issues (such as education, health, youth development,
economic development for low-income communities, and work force
288. Donovan & Roberts, supra note 251, at 145.
289. See Jackson, supra note 282, at 758 (“Under the ‘corporate social responsibility’ approach, the province of ‘business ethics’ gets denigrated to harum-scarum stratagems formulated as
reactions to alarms sounded by ‘stakeholders’ that are in turn dictated by galleries of activists purporting to be their appointed representatives.”). Jackson critiques such measures and argues that such
measures are often aimed at “promoting politically correct agendas.” Id.
290. See Anderson, supra note 34, at 23–24.
291. E-mail from Susan Thomas, Assistant Dir., Boston College Center for Corporate Citizenship, to Sarah Millard, Executive Editor, Denver University Law Review (Sept. 16, 2010, 15:59
MDT) (on file with Denver University Law Review) (This was originally posted in on the Boston
College Center for Corporate Citizenship website as What is Corporate Citizenship?, BOSTON
COLLEGE CENTER FOR CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP.) [hereinafter Boston College]. These principles are
no longer listed on the Boston College Center for Corporate Citizenship website. However, I continue to use them here because I believe they set out a solid initial framework for corporate citizenship.
292. Id.
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development), ensuring stable employment, paying fair wages, and
293
producing a product with social value.

The third principle of Corporate Citizenship is Accountability and
Responsiveness to Key Stakeholders, which has two parts.294 The first
part of the third principle is “[b]uild[ing] relationships of trust that involve becoming more transparent and open about the progress and setbacks businesses experience in an effort to operate ethically.”295 The
second part of the third principle is “[c]reat[ing] mechanisms to include
the voice of stakeholders in governance, produce social reports assured
by third parties, operate according to a code of conduct and listen to and
communicate with stakeholders.”296 Examples include creating mechanisms to include the voice of stakeholders in governance, producing social reports assured by third parties, operating according to a code of
conduct, and listening to and communicating with stakeholders.297
Finally, the fourth principle of Corporate Citizenship is a Strong Financial Return; this is defined as “return[ing] a profit to shareholders.”298
Business and management scholars have expressed the view that the responsibility of a company to return a profit to shareholders must always
be considered part of its obligation to society.299
Developing uniform model laws informed by principles of Global
Corporate Citizenship will require, among other things, transforming
voluntary guidelines and standards into mandatory and enforceable rules
and regulations.300 The first principle of Corporate Citizenship, Minimizing Harm, requires transnational corporations to minimize negative effects on all categories of stakeholders.301 In many ways, a legal standard
of Minimizing Harm could parallel this standard as it is set out in the
business and management literature. However, in a legal framework,
Minimizing Harm and sector-specific standards would be legally mandated. These would need to be enforceable under law to encourage compliance and provide legal avenues for redress. Such standards already
exist in a variety of areas such as the environment and labor law. In some
ways, developing laws to address this element are the easiest because
they fit easily into existing models that prohibit harmful behavior. Laws

293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. See id.
299. H. Jeff Smith, The Shareholders v. Stakeholders Debate, 44 MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. 85,
85–86 (2003) (discussing the rationale for profit in both shareholder and stakeholder theories of
management).
300. Options for lawmaking will need to be worked through in detail but this goes beyond the
scope of this paper.
301. Boston College, supra note 291.
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in this category could include and build on concepts developed in the
context of Corporate Social Responsibility.
As a legal standard, the second principle of Corporate Citizenship,
Maximizing Benefit, would require by law affirmative steps on the part of
transnational corporations to contribute to societal and economic well
being. This would go beyond the investment of resources in activities
that benefit various groups of stakeholders. Laws requiring Maximizing
Benefit(s) would need to be informed by research that explores what
kinds of laws create positive incentives. One way to maximize the benefits of foreign direct investment is for transnational corporations to exert
positive influence over things like water and sanitation,302 property
rights,303 and entrepreneurial skills and capabilities.304 This may be one
of the most controversial principles of corporate citizenship in a legal
context, particularly from the perspective of U.S. scholars and decision
makers.
The third principle of Corporate Citizenship, Accountability and Responsiveness to Key Stakeholders would require standards and transparency in a legal context.305 It would differ from the business and management perspectives because it would not focus on developing trust, which
is an essential goal of voluntary businesses relationships. Instead, it
would stem from the idea that transnational corporations have duties and
obligations to specific groups of stakeholders and to society as whole. In
a mandatory legal framework, this principle could encompass the setting
of standards for ethical business operation. It would also include core
principles of corporate citizenship in the business and management literature, such as stakeholder participation and third party monitoring306
Laws in this category could include and build on those developed in the
context of Corporate Social Accountability.
For a mandatory legal framework, this Article proposes a substantive change to the fourth principle of Corporate Citizenship. Rather than
a Strong Financial Return, a legal framework could instead require a
Competitive Financial Return. This would be a shift from traditional
profit-maximization models, which go further than the goal of a Strong
302. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND D EVELOPMENT, WORLD I NVESTMENT REPORT 2008:
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE INFRASTRUCTURE CHALLENGE, at 140 , U.N. Sales No.
E.08.II.D.23 (2008), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2008_en.pdf (discussing the
effects of the lack of water and sanitation on child mortality, maternal health and gender equality).
303. See, e.g., Leslie Kurshan, Rethinking Property Rights as Human Rights: Acquiring Equal
Property Rights for Women Using International Human Rights Treaties, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 353, 357–59 (2000).
304. See OECD, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FOR D EVELOPMENT: MAXIMIZING BENEFITS,
MINIMIZING COSTS 14–15 (2002) (discussing potential for multinational corporations to enhance
entrepreneurial capacity in developing countries), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/51/
1959815.pdf.
305. Boston College, supra note 291.
306. See id.
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Financial Return.307 Achieving a Strong Financial Return is a goal for a
corporation and its officers and directors.308 It is an internal guideline.
Achieving a Competitive Financial Return is a standard that can be balanced against industry norms and practices as well as the other three
principles of corporate citizenship. A Competitive Financial Return standard would allow corporations to consider the interests of stakeholders
other than shareholders. In contrast to a Strong Financial Return, a Competitive Financial Return is an external standard that should be determined with consideration of external factors. In a legal context, appropriate legislation would need to be enacted to give transnational corporations an incentive to balance economic goals with socio-political goals.
This proposal is structured to be compatible with the U.N. Framework. Transnational corporations’ effects on human rights have been the
focus of recent work by John Ruggie’s team under the auspices of the
United Nations.309 Ruggie and his team have developed a “protect, respect, and remedy framework,” also known as the U.N. Framework, that
can serve as a foundation for further work in this area.310
Integrating Global Corporate Citizenship into the U.N. Framework
will allow for the development of a more robust and comprehensive system. Imagine then a matrix in which to classify global lawmaking. The xaxis would be populated by the categories of protect, respect, and remedy
from the U.N. Framework. The y-axis would be populated by the four
principles of corporate citizenship. Laws would be classified by their
position at the intersection of the x- and y-axes.
Simply drafting model global laws has the potential to create soft
law and encourage practices that reduce or prevent corporate-related
human rights abuses. However, without hard law, potential plaintiffs
would not be able to seek judicial or other enforcement of their rights.
The next Section sets out an initial proposal for enforcement, the final
element of this proposal.

307. See Smith, supra note 299, at 85 (“As Milton Friedman wrote, ‘There is one and only one
social responsibility of business—to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase
its profits so long as it . . . engages in open and free competition, without deception or fraud.’”
(alteration in original)).
308. See Boston College, supra note 291 (articulating principle of “support[ing] strong financial results” using normative rather than binding language).
309. Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Business and Human Rights: Further Steps
Toward the Operationalization of the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/14/27 (April 9, 2010) (by John Ruggie), available at http://www.reports-andmaterials.org/Ruggie-report-2010.pdf; Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue
of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Protect, Respect
and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, U.N. Doc A/HRC/8/5 (April 7, 2008)
(by John Ruggie), available at http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie-report-7-Apr-2008.pdf.
310. Id.
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C. Global Enforcement
The rights of victims of corporate-related human rights abuses are
under-enforced and, therefore, the third component of this proposal is the
expansion of adjudicatory and enforcement options.311 This expansion
should help compensate for the fact that some states enforce and adjudicate fewer claims or adjudicate less consistently than others. This proposal envisions adjudication of claims of corporate-related human rights
abuses in domestic courts and universal civil jurisdiction for corporaterelated human rights abuses.312 However, it does not exclude the possibility of a global court or convention on enforcement of alternative forms of
dispute resolution in the future.313 This is an initial proposal that will be
expanded and refined in a future article entitled Universal Civil Jurisdiction: Adjudicating Corporate-Related Human Rights Abuses (working
title). Universal civil jurisdiction would allow civil claims of corporaterelated human rights abuses to be brought in domestic courts regardless
of the nationality of the parties or the location and effects of the conduct.314
Universal civil jurisdiction should be established for the limited
scope of corporate-related human rights abuses. In a multinational context, jurisdiction is generally determined by domestic and international
rules.315 Universal civil jurisdiction would make it possible to bring a
civil suit against a transnational corporation for corporate-related human
rights abuses by any plaintiff in a domestic court in any country. One
issue raised by universal civil jurisdiction is how to prevent unfairly
overburdening the courts of any one jurisdiction.

311. This is an initial proposal that I am expanding and refining in a forthcoming article entitled Toward Global Adjudication and Enforcement of Corporate-Related Human Rights Abuses
(working title).
312. See Beth Van Shaack, Justice Without Borders: Universal Civil Jurisdiction, 99 AM.
SOC’ Y I NT’ L L. PROC. 120, 122 (2005) (arguing that “[s]upranational mechanisms will never supplant domestic proceedings, so domestic courts will continue to play a central role in enforcing
international law”); see also Dubinsky, supra note 225, at 306 (arguing that “[b]ecause much that is
productive has come out of human rights adjudication to date, because the phenomenon is still fairly
recent, and because there is not much that suggests it is harmful, we should go forward with a series
of rebuttable presumptions: that victims of fundamental human rights treaty violations should not be
beyond effective judicial protection; that alleged perpetrators should not enjoy impunity; that courts,
as institutions best designed to provide fair process and decision-making insulated from political
pressure, are appropriate for dealing with guilt, punishment, liability, and compensation”).
313. See Dubinsky, supra note 225, at 307–12 (comparing the advantages and disadvantages of
international vs. domestic courts).
314. See Menno T. Kamminga, Universal Civil Jurisdiction: Is it Legal? Is it Desirable?, 99
AM. SOC’Y I NT’ L L. PROC. 123, 123 (2005) (defining universal civil jurisdiction as “the principle
under which civil proceedings may be brought in a domestic court irrespective of the location of the
unlawful conduct and irrespective of the nationality of the perpetrator or the victim, on the grounds
that the unlawful conduct is a matter of international concern”).
315. See generally Born, supra note 202, at 11–22 (conducting comparative assessment of
jurisdiction determinations among national courts facing transnational controversies).
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Existing international law does not explicitly authorize universal
civil jurisdiction.316 However, universal civil jurisdiction also is not inconsistent with international law.317 Thus, an expansion of universal civil
jurisdiction is not precluded under international law. The Global Law
Commission could contribute to ensuring the enforceability of universal
civil jurisdiction by helping establish and advocating for soft-law norms
that eventually could become customary international law. Another way
to establish universal civil jurisdiction would be via an international convention. This would not undermine the development of global law but
rather would reflect the interconnectedness and interdependency of
global law and international law.
A Global Law Commission and the uniform model laws promulgated by the Global Law Commission should define the types of conduct
to which universal civil jurisdiction would apply. The scope of relevant
conduct should be broader than the types of tort claims that have been
permitted, for example, under the U.S. Alien Tort Statute.318 In addition,
it should explicitly apply to conduct by and claims against transnational
corporations.319 However, it would not have to include every form of
conduct that impinges on a human right enumerated in uniform model
laws as drafted by the Global Law Commission. Further, universal civil
jurisdiction should not prevent tort claims from being brought in proceedings based on universal criminal jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
One of the most important issues in human rights law today is the
role of corporations. The crisis of corporate-related human rights abuses
demands a response. Corporate-related activities continue to cause harm
316. See Kamminga, supra note 314, at 123–24 (claiming that “[n]o rule of international law
specifically authorizes let alone obliges the exercise of universal civil jurisdiction in respect of
human rights offenders”).
317. See id. at 124 (discussing the lack of objections to U.S. courts’ exercise of universal civil
jurisdiction for alien tort claims); cf. Shaack, supra note 312, at 120 (claiming that “[i]nternational
law authorizes universal civil jurisdiction”).
318. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006); Sosa v. Alverez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724–25 (2004) (requiring ATCA claims “based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the
18th-century paradigms [the Court has] recognized,” namely violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy). See generally William S. Dodge, Which Torts in
Violation of the Law of Nations?, 24 HASTINGS I NT’ L & COMP. L. REV. 351 (2001) for a discussion
of the types of torts that are actionable under the Alien Tort Statute. See generally Richard M. Buxbaum & David D. Caron, The Alien Tort Statute: An Overview of the Current Issues, 28 BERKELEY
J. INT’L L. 513 (2010) for issues in Alien Tort Statute jurisprudence.
319. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 149 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding that
Alien Tort Claims Act does not apply to corporate defendants). See generally David A. Dana &
Michael Barsa, Three Obstacles to the Promotion of Corporate Social Responsibility by Means of
the Alien Tort Claims Act: The Sosa Court’s Incoherent Conception of the Law of Nations, The
‘Purposive’ Action Requirement for Aiding and Abetting, and The State Action Requirement for
Primary
Liability,
FORDHAM
ENVTL.
L.
REV.
(forthcoming),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1711934, for a discussion of obstacles inhibiting successful claims against
transnational corporations.
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around the world in every area of human rights. This Article has argued
that the current state-centered international human rights regime is inadequate to respond comprehensively to this pressing problem.
At least three questions are central to determining whether corporate-related human rights abuses present a problem of sufficient importance and consequence that they can be adequately addressed only with a
new legal and regulatory regime. First, is there a deficit in domestic and
international regulation of transnational corporations? Second, what are
possible explanations for this deficit? Third, what are the effects of this
deficit? This Article has attempted to answer each of these questions as
well as others. However, there are many questions that remain unanswered that will be explored in more depth in a series of future articles.
Understanding corporate-related human rights abuses, their causes,
and the reasons they persist requires the analysis of a series of secondary
questions. These include questions that focus on existing structures as
well as questions that are forward looking. What is the current system for
regulating transnational corporations, who makes the rules, and who controls implementation and monitoring? What are the goals of the current
system and is it achieving those goals? What are the assumptions underlying the current system and are they accurate? How does the system
work and what parts are working or not working? If the system is not
working, why is it not working? Are the parts that are not working important, who does this affect, and how?
What needs to be done to improve the regulation of transnational
corporations? Do we need new laws, a new system, or even to change the
way we theorize the regulation of transnational corporations?
This Article has made two main proposals: (1) decouple and distinguish human rights law and international human rights law, and (2) create a global human rights law system. This Article argued that it is necessary to understand human rights law as a super-category and international human rights law as a sub-category rather than as synonyms. This
reclassification highlights a deficiency in the development of human
rights law and creates a space in which to generate and advance other
areas of human rights law. This Article then proposed global human
rights law as a new area of human rights law that is well suited to address
corporate-related human rights abuses.
Of course, the creation of a new regulatory framework is neither
simple nor easy. It requires consideration of multiple constituencies with
a wide range of—sometimes competing—interests. Proposals for increasing regulation may be met with resistance from many directions,
including states that fear the loss of capital and other benefits from foreign direct investment, bureaucrats who fear the loss of power, and companies that fear increased costs. Decision makers may worry about insti-
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tutional competence, administrability of rules, and overburdening existing enforcement mechanisms.
This Article made several specific proposals for the development of
a global human rights law regime: a Global Law Commission, uniform
model laws and regulations, and universal civil jurisdiction. The emphasis of this proposal on global law rather than international law sets it
apart from many earlier attempts to comprehensively regulate the activities of transnational corporations. Although implementation of this proposal would take time and would need to be achieved in stages, forward
progress can be made in all three components of this proposal simultaneously.
One possible critique of this Article stems from the assumptions it
makes about the role of morality and ethics in theorizing business practices, assumptions that are disputed in the U.S. legal academy, and in fact
represent a minority perspective in the United States. However, part of
the value of an academic discourse is the dialogue itself and the dissection, agreement, disagreement, and refinement of ideas. Therefore, if, in
the United States, this Article simply sparks further discussion about
global law and Global Corporate Citizenship among U.S. legal scholars
and policy makers, it will have achieved one of its purposes.
Future articles will need to respond to a number of questions about
prior and existing measures and attempts in greater detail. First, what
attempts have been made to account for social considerations in the regulation of transnational corporations? Second, what can we learn from
prior successes and failures? Third, are global law and Law and Global
Corporate Citizenship new names for existing initiatives pulled together
in a systematic way or do they represent completely new frameworks or
something in between? This Article and earlier articles have begun answering some of these questions.
An exploration of the strengths and weaknesses of prior and existing regulatory efforts can be facilitated by answering another set of secondary questions. These include questions that focus on an assessment of
specific measures. What is the status quo in academic literature and policy making? Is Global Corporate Citizenship already influencing law and
policy and, if so, where and how? Which aspects are working or not
working? What other types of measures and regulation have been tried in
the past? Are there successful examples that we can draw from? Are
there steps that we can take to avoid past failures? Where different approaches have been used, why were they chosen, what can be gleaned
from a comparison? Can models that are developed and implemented in
different countries be adapted to work in other countries or at a global
level?
Finally, there are three questions that are arguably central to developing a new regulatory framework built on a foundation of global law
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and Law and Global Corporate Citizenship. First, what should be the
values and goals of a new legal regime? Second, what form should the
implementation of a new framework take and who should play a role in
the implementation? Third, how will the new laws and regulations be
enforced? This Article proposed initial responses to these questions,
which will be explored in more depth in a series of future articles.
Moving toward a more comprehensive regulatory framework will
require the analysis of a final cluster of secondary questions. These are
set out in sub-groups below. Some questions aim to flesh out values and
goals. Who should decide what values should inform the new framework
and from what sources can we draw such values? What steps should be
taken in the short-, mid-, and long-term? Are there stages or can all parts
of a new system be implemented simultaneously?
Other questions aim to assess what is needed to achieve the creation
of a new regulatory regime. Is the existing literature sufficient or do we
need more research? What types of data and studies would be useful?
What is required to garner sufficient state support and participation in a
global system? Who will fund a global legal system? Will this new
global law system require new institutions and laws and, if so, what form
should they take?
Some questions focus on roles and responsibilities. Who would be
responsible for developing a Global Corporate Citizenship approach?
What institutions will be involved? Is there a role for corporations in the
development of a new framework and, if so, what is it?
Further questions would address the purpose of a new regulatory
system and those who would benefit from or oppose such a framework.
What would be the purpose and goals of a new institution and laws?
Who would benefit from the new regulatory regime? Are there groups or
institutions on which the new framework would have a detrimental effect? Who would be opposed to this approach and why?
Finally, it is also necessary to address questions of administrability.
How would we administer and monitor the effectiveness of this approach? What structures should be set up to carry out this evaluation?
How much will this approach cost and how can we achieve sustainability? What would be some of the stumbling blocks and how could we
address them?
Some people may find the conclusion of this Article with more
questions than answers unsatisfying. They may be even more unsatisfied
to learn that the many questions noted here are not exhaustive. However,
I believe this reflects the fact that this is the beginning of a large project
and this Article does not aspire or attempt to comprehensively explore all
relevant questions.
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As is always the case when proposing a new or different regulatory
regime, one opens oneself up to critique. For example, when one suggests revisiting the relationship between human rights law and international human rights law, as is the case with this Article–one question that
does or should follow is, if we ask a different question, then are we asking the right one. This Article argues that the question of whether international human rights law is able to or even should be the sole or primary
system of laws to govern corporate-related human rights abuses is pivotal—although there may also be other “right” questions that should be
asked.
The goals of this Article are both ambitious and modest. They are
ambitious because the proposal of a new or different regulatory regime
can almost always be described as ambitious. At the same time, global
law is attracting increasing attention in non-national legal scholarship.
Global Corporate Citizenship is not new but was developed in other
fields and in practice, and enjoys the support of international institutions.
Nonetheless, the proposal to develop a systematic framework for regulating transnational corporations in the area of human rights is ambitious.
Therefore, the proposal set out in this Article is necessarily rudimentary
and will require fleshing out over time in future articles.

